kernel-alx-legacy/patches-4.9/0219-4.9.120-all-fixes.patch

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index 6d75a9c00e8a..069e8d52c991 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
@@ -367,3 +368,26 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
 		"Not affected"	  CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
+
+		Details about the l1tf file can be found in
+		Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+
+What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
+Date:		June 2018
+Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:	Control Symetric Multi Threading (SMT)
+
+		active:  Tells whether SMT is active (enabled and siblings online)
+
+		control: Read/write interface to control SMT. Possible
+			 values:
+
+			 "on"		SMT is enabled
+			 "off"		SMT is disabled
+			 "forceoff"	SMT is force disabled. Cannot be changed.
+			 "notsupported" SMT is not supported by the CPU
+
+			 If control status is "forceoff" or "notsupported" writes
+			 are rejected.
diff --git a/Documentation/index.rst b/Documentation/index.rst
index c53d089455a4..213399aac757 100644
--- a/Documentation/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/index.rst
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Contents:
    :maxdepth: 2
 
    kernel-documentation
+   l1tf
    development-process/index
    dev-tools/tools
    driver-api/index
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index a16f87e4dd10..a36a695318c6 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2010,10 +2010,84 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			(virtualized real and unpaged mode) on capable
 			Intel chips. Default is 1 (enabled)
 
+	kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=[KVM,Intel] Mitigation for L1 Terminal Fault
+			CVE-2018-3620.
+
+			Valid arguments: never, cond, always
+
+			always: L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
+			cond:	Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between
+				VMEXIT and VMENTER can leak host memory.
+			never:	Disables the mitigation
+
+			Default is cond (do L1 cache flush in specific instances)
+
 	kvm-intel.vpid=	[KVM,Intel] Disable Virtual Processor Identification
 			feature (tagged TLBs) on capable Intel chips.
 			Default is 1 (enabled)
 
+	l1tf=           [X86] Control mitigation of the L1TF vulnerability on
+			      affected CPUs
+
+			The kernel PTE inversion protection is unconditionally
+			enabled and cannot be disabled.
+
+			full
+				Provides all available mitigations for the
+				L1TF vulnerability. Disables SMT and
+				enables all mitigations in the
+				hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flush.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			full,force
+				Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D
+				flush runtime control. Implies the
+				'nosmt=force' command line option.
+				(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
+
+			flush
+				Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default
+				hypervisor mitigation, i.e. conditional
+				L1D flush.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			flush,nosmt
+
+				Disables SMT and enables the default
+				hypervisor mitigation.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			flush,nowarn
+				Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not
+				warn when a VM is started in a potentially
+				insecure configuration.
+
+			off
+				Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
+				emit any warnings.
+
+			Default is 'flush'.
+
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+
 	l2cr=		[PPC]
 
 	l3cr=		[PPC]
@@ -2694,6 +2768,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 	nosmt		[KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
 			Equivalent to smt=1.
 
+			[KNL,x86] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
+			nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
+				     via the sysfs control file.
+
 	nospectre_v2	[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
 			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
diff --git a/Documentation/l1tf.rst b/Documentation/l1tf.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bae52b845de0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/l1tf.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,610 @@
+L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
+========================
+
+L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
+speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
+when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
+for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+   - A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft,
+     Penwell, Pineview, Silvermont, Airmont, Merrifield)
+
+   - The Intel XEON PHI family
+
+   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. If the bit is set the CPU is not affected
+     by the Meltdown vulnerability either. These CPUs should become
+     available by end of 2018.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the L1TF
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`l1tf_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the L1TF vulnerability:
+
+   =============  =================  ==============================
+   CVE-2018-3615  L1 Terminal Fault  SGX related aspects
+   CVE-2018-3620  L1 Terminal Fault  OS, SMM related aspects
+   CVE-2018-3646  L1 Terminal Fault  Virtualization related aspects
+   =============  =================  ==============================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page
+table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set,
+then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced
+data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced
+by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible.
+
+While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise
+a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the
+data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the
+opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
+similar to the Meltdown attack.
+
+While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
+allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
+works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
+works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the
+extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+1. Malicious user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Operating Systems store arbitrary information in the address bits of a
+   PTE which is marked non present. This allows a malicious user space
+   application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
+   In some cases user-space can maliciously influence the information
+   encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
+   deterministic and more practical.
+
+   The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
+   inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
+   impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
+   marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
+
+   A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
+   malicious user space applications.
+
+2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The fact that L1TF breaks all domain protections allows malicious guest
+   OSes, which can control the PTEs directly, and malicious guest user
+   space applications, which run on an unprotected guest kernel lacking the
+   PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
+
+   A special aspect of L1TF in the context of virtualization is symmetric
+   multi threading (SMT). The Intel implementation of SMT is called
+   HyperThreading. The fact that Hyperthreads on the affected processors
+   share the L1 Data Cache (L1D) is important for this. As the flaw allows
+   only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
+   on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
+   the context which runs on the sibling Hyperthread of the same physical
+   core. This context can be host OS, host user space or a different guest.
+
+   If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
+   only possible, when the hypervisor does not sanitize the content of the
+   effective (shadow) page tables.
+
+   While solutions exist to mitigate these attack vectors fully, these
+   mitigations are not enabled by default in the Linux kernel because they
+   can affect performance significantly. The kernel provides several
+   mechanisms which can be utilized to address the problem depending on the
+   deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact
+   are described in the next sections.
+
+   The default mitigations and the rationale for choosing them are explained
+   at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`.
+
+.. _l1tf_sys_info:
+
+L1TF system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current L1TF
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  ===========================   ===============================
+  'Not affected'		The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Mitigation: PTE Inversion'	The host protection is active
+  ===========================   ===============================
+
+If KVM/VMX is enabled and the processor is vulnerable then the following
+information is appended to the 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' part:
+
+  - SMT status:
+
+    =====================  ================
+    'VMX: SMT vulnerable'  SMT is enabled
+    'VMX: SMT disabled'    SMT is disabled
+    =====================  ================
+
+  - L1D Flush mode:
+
+    ================================  ====================================
+    'L1D vulnerable'		      L1D flushing is disabled
+
+    'L1D conditional cache flushes'   L1D flush is conditionally enabled
+
+    'L1D cache flushes'		      L1D flush is unconditionally enabled
+    ================================  ====================================
+
+The resulting grade of protection is discussed in the following sections.
+
+
+Host mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
+user space running on the host.
+
+
+Guest mitigation mechanisms
+---------------------------
+
+.. _l1d_flush:
+
+1. L1D flush on VMENTER
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To make sure that a guest cannot attack data which is present in the L1D
+   the hypervisor flushes the L1D before entering the guest.
+
+   Flushing the L1D evicts not only the data which should not be accessed
+   by a potentially malicious guest, it also flushes the guest
+   data. Flushing the L1D has a performance impact as the processor has to
+   bring the flushed guest data back into the L1D. Depending on the
+   frequency of VMEXIT/VMENTER and the type of computations in the guest
+   performance degradation in the range of 1% to 50% has been observed. For
+   scenarios where guest VMEXIT/VMENTER are rare the performance impact is
+   minimal. Virtio and mechanisms like posted interrupts are designed to
+   confine the VMEXITs to a bare minimum, but specific configurations and
+   application scenarios might still suffer from a high VMEXIT rate.
+
+   The kernel provides two L1D flush modes:
+    - conditional ('cond')
+    - unconditional ('always')
+
+   The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute
+   only audited code paths before the corresponding VMENTER. These code
+   paths have been verified that they cannot expose secrets or other
+   interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the
+   address space layout of the hypervisor.
+
+   Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides
+   maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional
+   mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the
+   workload scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs.
+
+   The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel
+   defaults to conditional mode on affected processors.
+
+   **Note**, that L1D flush does not prevent the SMT problem because the
+   sibling thread will also bring back its data into the L1D which makes it
+   attackable again.
+
+   L1D flush can be controlled by the administrator via the kernel command
+   line and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`
+   and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+.. _guest_confinement:
+
+2. Guest VCPU confinement to dedicated physical cores
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To address the SMT problem, it is possible to make a guest or a group of
+   guests affine to one or more physical cores. The proper mechanism for
+   that is to utilize exclusive cpusets to ensure that no other guest or
+   host tasks can run on these cores.
+
+   If only a single guest or related guests run on sibling SMT threads on
+   the same physical core then they can only attack their own memory and
+   restricted parts of the host memory.
+
+   Host memory is attackable, when one of the sibling SMT threads runs in
+   host OS (hypervisor) context and the other in guest context. The amount
+   of valuable information from the host OS context depends on the context
+   which the host OS executes, i.e. interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel
+   threads. The amount of valuable data from these contexts cannot be
+   declared as non-interesting for an attacker without deep inspection of
+   the code.
+
+   **Note**, that assigning guests to a fixed set of physical cores affects
+   the ability of the scheduler to do load balancing and might have
+   negative effects on CPU utilization depending on the hosting
+   scenario. Disabling SMT might be a viable alternative for particular
+   scenarios.
+
+   For further information about confining guests to a single or to a group
+   of cores consult the cpusets documentation:
+
+   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt
+
+.. _interrupt_isolation:
+
+3. Interrupt affinity
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Interrupts can be made affine to logical CPUs. This is not universally
+   true because there are types of interrupts which are truly per CPU
+   interrupts, e.g. the local timer interrupt. Aside of that multi queue
+   devices affine their interrupts to single CPUs or groups of CPUs per
+   queue without allowing the administrator to control the affinities.
+
+   Moving the interrupts, which can be affinity controlled, away from CPUs
+   which run untrusted guests, reduces the attack vector space.
+
+   Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted
+   guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system
+   configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some
+   of the interrupts it can be assumed that they won't expose interesting
+   information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there
+   is no way to make general assumptions.
+
+   Interrupt affinity can be controlled by the administrator via the
+   /proc/irq/$NR/smp_affinity[_list] files. Limited documentation is
+   available at:
+
+   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-affinity.txt
+
+.. _smt_control:
+
+4. SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To prevent the SMT issues of L1TF it might be necessary to disable SMT
+   completely. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but
+   the impact depends on the hosting scenario and the type of workloads.
+   The impact of disabling SMT needs also to be weighted against the impact
+   of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
+
+   The kernel provides a sysfs interface to retrieve the status of SMT and
+   to control it. It also provides a kernel command line interface to
+   control SMT.
+
+   The kernel command line interface consists of the following options:
+
+     =========== ==========================================================
+     nosmt	 Affects the bring up of the secondary CPUs during boot. The
+		 kernel tries to bring all present CPUs online during the
+		 boot process. "nosmt" makes sure that from each physical
+		 core only one - the so called primary (hyper) thread is
+		 activated. Due to a design flaw of Intel processors related
+		 to Machine Check Exceptions the non primary siblings have
+		 to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down
+		 again.  "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface.
+
+     nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt" but it does not allow to
+		 undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface.
+     =========== ==========================================================
+
+   The sysfs interface provides two files:
+
+   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
+   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control:
+
+     This file allows to read out the SMT control state and provides the
+     ability to disable or (re)enable SMT. The possible states are:
+
+	==============  ===================================================
+	on		SMT is supported by the CPU and enabled. All
+			logical CPUs can be onlined and offlined without
+			restrictions.
+
+	off		SMT is supported by the CPU and disabled. Only
+			the so called primary SMT threads can be onlined
+			and offlined without restrictions. An attempt to
+			online a non-primary sibling is rejected
+
+	forceoff	Same as 'off' but the state cannot be controlled.
+			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+
+	notsupported	The processor does not support SMT. It's therefore
+			not affected by the SMT implications of L1TF.
+			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+	==============  ===================================================
+
+     The possible states which can be written into this file to control SMT
+     state are:
+
+     - on
+     - off
+     - forceoff
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active:
+
+     This file reports whether SMT is enabled and active, i.e. if on any
+     physical core two or more sibling threads are online.
+
+   SMT control is also possible at boot time via the l1tf kernel command
+   line parameter in combination with L1D flush control. See
+   :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+5. Disabling EPT
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
+  with SMT enabled, because the effective page tables for guests are
+  managed and sanitized by the hypervisor. Though disabling EPT has a
+  significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
+  KPTI is enabled.
+
+  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
+address the performance impact of disabling SMT or EPT.
+
+.. _mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot
+time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  full		Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF
+		vulnerability. Disables SMT and enables all mitigations in
+		the hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flushing
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  full,force	Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D flush runtime
+		control. Implies the 'nosmt=force' command line option.
+		(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
+
+  flush		Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default hypervisor
+		mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  flush,nosmt	Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
+		i.e. conditional L1D flushing.
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  flush,nowarn	Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when a VM is
+		started in a potentially insecure configuration.
+
+  off		Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
+		warnings.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
+
+
+.. _mitigation_control_kvm:
+
+Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
+-------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism, flushing the L1D cache when
+entering a guest, can be controlled with a module parameter.
+
+The option/parameter is "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=". It takes the
+following arguments:
+
+  ============  ==============================================================
+  always	L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
+
+  cond		Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between VMEXIT and
+		VMENTER can leak host memory which is considered
+		interesting for an attacker. This still can leak host memory
+		which allows e.g. to determine the hosts address space layout.
+
+  never		Disables the mitigation
+  ============  ==============================================================
+
+The parameter can be provided on the kernel command line, as a module
+parameter when loading the modules and at runtime modified via the sysfs
+file:
+
+/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/vmentry_l1d_flush
+
+The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
+line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
+module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. No virtualization in use
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
+   action is required.
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If the guest comes from a trusted source and the guest OS kernel is
+   guaranteed to have the L1TF mitigations in place the system is fully
+   protected against L1TF and no further action is required.
+
+   To avoid the overhead of the default L1D flushing on VMENTER the
+   administrator can disable the flushing via the kernel command line and
+   sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+   :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+3.1. SMT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If SMT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the BIOS or by
+  the kernel, it's only required to enforce L1D flushing on VMENTER.
+
+  Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+  :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+3.2. EPT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If EPT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the hypervisor,
+  the system is fully protected. SMT can stay enabled and L1D flushing on
+  VMENTER is not required.
+
+  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+3.3. SMT and EPT supported and active
+"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If SMT and EPT are supported and active then various degrees of
+  mitigations can be employed:
+
+  - L1D flushing on VMENTER:
+
+    L1D flushing on VMENTER is the minimal protection requirement, but it
+    is only potent in combination with other mitigation methods.
+
+    Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+  - Guest confinement:
+
+    Confinement of guests to a single or a group of physical cores which
+    are not running any other processes, can reduce the attack surface
+    significantly, but interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel threads can
+    still expose valuable data to a potential attacker. See
+    :ref:`guest_confinement`.
+
+  - Interrupt isolation:
+
+    Isolating the guest CPUs from interrupts can reduce the attack surface
+    further, but still allows a malicious guest to explore a limited amount
+    of host physical memory. This can at least be used to gain knowledge
+    about the host address space layout. The interrupts which have a fixed
+    affinity to the CPUs which run the untrusted guests can depending on
+    the scenario still trigger soft interrupts and schedule kernel threads
+    which might expose valuable information. See
+    :ref:`interrupt_isolation`.
+
+The above three mitigation methods combined can provide protection to a
+certain degree, but the risk of the remaining attack surface has to be
+carefully analyzed. For full protection the following methods are
+available:
+
+  - Disabling SMT:
+
+    Disabling SMT and enforcing the L1D flushing provides the maximum
+    amount of protection. This mitigation is not depending on any of the
+    above mitigation methods.
+
+    SMT control and L1D flushing can be tuned by the command line
+    parameters 'nosmt', 'l1tf', 'kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush' and at run
+    time with the matching sysfs control files. See :ref:`smt_control`,
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+  - Disabling EPT:
+
+    Disabling EPT provides the maximum amount of protection as well. It is
+    not depending on any of the above mitigation methods. SMT can stay
+    enabled and L1D flushing is not required, but the performance impact is
+    significant.
+
+    EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
+    parameter.
+
+3.4. Nested virtual machines
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
+the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
+machine.  VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
+guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
+bare metal hypervisor it wiil:
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
+   nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
+   exposed to the nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested virtual machine to
+   the nested hypervisor; this is a complex operation, and flushing the L1D
+   cache avoids that the bare metal hypervisor's secrets are exposed to the
+   nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Instruct the nested hypervisor to not perform any L1D cache flush. This
+   is an optimization to avoid double L1D flushing.
+
+
+.. _default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+  - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
+    unconditionally and cannot be controlled.
+
+  - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
+    a guest.
+
+  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted guests with EPT enabled.
+
+  The rationale for this choice is:
+
+  - Force disabling SMT can break existing setups, especially with
+    unattended updates.
+
+  - If regular users run untrusted guests on their machine, then L1TF is
+    just an add on to other malware which might be embedded in an untrusted
+    guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
+
+    There is no technical way to prevent a user from running untrusted code
+    on their machines blindly.
+
+  - It's technically extremely unlikely and from today's knowledge even
+    impossible that L1TF can be exploited via the most popular attack
+    mechanisms like JavaScript because these mechanisms have no way to
+    control PTEs. If this would be possible and not other mitigation would
+    be possible, then the default might be different.
+
+  - The administrators of cloud and hosting setups have to carefully
+    analyze the risk for their scenarios and make the appropriate
+    mitigation choices, which might even vary across their deployed
+    machines and also result in other changes of their overall setup.
+    There is no way for the kernel to provide a sensible default for this
+    kind of scenarios.
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
index e46c14fac9da..3ff58a8ffabb 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
@@ -122,14 +122,15 @@ KVM_CAP_S390_UCONTROL and use the flag KVM_VM_S390_UCONTROL as
 privileged user (CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
 
 
-4.3 KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST
+4.3 KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST, KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
 
-Capability: basic
+Capability: basic, KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES for KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
 Architectures: x86
-Type: system
+Type: system ioctl
 Parameters: struct kvm_msr_list (in/out)
 Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
 Errors:
+  EFAULT:    the msr index list cannot be read from or written to
   E2BIG:     the msr index list is to be to fit in the array specified by
              the user.
 
@@ -138,16 +139,23 @@ struct kvm_msr_list {
 	__u32 indices[0];
 };
 
-This ioctl returns the guest msrs that are supported.  The list varies
-by kvm version and host processor, but does not change otherwise.  The
-user fills in the size of the indices array in nmsrs, and in return
-kvm adjusts nmsrs to reflect the actual number of msrs and fills in
-the indices array with their numbers.
+The user fills in the size of the indices array in nmsrs, and in return
+kvm adjusts nmsrs to reflect the actual number of msrs and fills in the
+indices array with their numbers.
+
+KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST returns the guest msrs that are supported.  The list
+varies by kvm version and host processor, but does not change otherwise.
 
 Note: if kvm indicates supports MCE (KVM_CAP_MCE), then the MCE bank MSRs are
 not returned in the MSR list, as different vcpus can have a different number
 of banks, as set via the KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE ioctl.
 
+KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST returns the list of MSRs that can be passed
+to the KVM_GET_MSRS system ioctl.  This lets userspace probe host capabilities
+and processor features that are exposed via MSRs (e.g., VMX capabilities).
+This list also varies by kvm version and host processor, but does not change
+otherwise.
+
 
 4.4 KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION
 
@@ -474,14 +482,22 @@ Support for this has been removed.  Use KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG instead.
 
 4.18 KVM_GET_MSRS
 
-Capability: basic
+Capability: basic (vcpu), KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES (system)
 Architectures: x86
-Type: vcpu ioctl
+Type: system ioctl, vcpu ioctl
 Parameters: struct kvm_msrs (in/out)
-Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+Returns: number of msrs successfully returned;
+        -1 on error
+
+When used as a system ioctl:
+Reads the values of MSR-based features that are available for the VM.  This
+is similar to KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID, but it returns MSR indices and values.
+The list of msr-based features can be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
+in a system ioctl.
 
+When used as a vcpu ioctl:
 Reads model-specific registers from the vcpu.  Supported msr indices can
-be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST.
+be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST in a system ioctl.
 
 struct kvm_msrs {
 	__u32 nmsrs; /* number of msrs in entries */
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 0723bbe1d4a7..fea2fe577185 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 9
-SUBLEVEL = 119
+SUBLEVEL = 120
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Roaring Lionus
 
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 659bdd079277..b39d0f93c67b 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
 config KEXEC_CORE
 	bool
 
+config HOTPLUG_SMT
+	bool
+
 config OPROFILE
 	tristate "OProfile system profiling"
 	depends on PROFILING
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi
index 1a473e83efbf..a885052157f0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi
@@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@
 				  /* non-prefetchable memory */
 				  0x82000000 0 0x08000000 0x08000000 0 0x00f00000>;
 			num-lanes = <1>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 123 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 120 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clocks = <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_REF_125M>,
 				 <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_AXI>,
 				 <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_LVDS1_OUT>,
diff --git a/arch/parisc/Kconfig b/arch/parisc/Kconfig
index a14b86587013..3c37af11dab6 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/parisc/Kconfig
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ config PREFETCH
 
 config MLONGCALLS
 	bool "Enable the -mlong-calls compiler option for big kernels"
-	def_bool y if (!MODULES)
+	default y
 	depends on PA8X00
 	help
 	  If you configure the kernel to include many drivers built-in instead
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/barrier.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dbaaca84f27f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __ASM_BARRIER_H
+#define __ASM_BARRIER_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/* The synchronize caches instruction executes as a nop on systems in
+   which all memory references are performed in order. */
+#define synchronize_caches() __asm__ __volatile__ ("sync" : : : "memory")
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SMP)
+#define mb()		do { synchronize_caches(); } while (0)
+#define rmb()		mb()
+#define wmb()		mb()
+#define dma_rmb()	mb()
+#define dma_wmb()	mb()
+#else
+#define mb()		barrier()
+#define rmb()		barrier()
+#define wmb()		barrier()
+#define dma_rmb()	barrier()
+#define dma_wmb()	barrier()
+#endif
+
+#define __smp_mb()	mb()
+#define __smp_rmb()	mb()
+#define __smp_wmb()	mb()
+
+#include <asm-generic/barrier.h>
+
+#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+#endif /* __ASM_BARRIER_H */
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S b/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S
index e3d3e8e1d708..015614405755 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S
@@ -481,6 +481,8 @@
 	/* Release pa_tlb_lock lock without reloading lock address. */
 	.macro		tlb_unlock0	spc,tmp
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+	or,COND(=)	%r0,\spc,%r0
+	sync
 	or,COND(=)	%r0,\spc,%r0
 	stw             \spc,0(\tmp)
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/pacache.S b/arch/parisc/kernel/pacache.S
index 67b0f7532e83..3e163df49cf3 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/pacache.S
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/pacache.S
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ ENDPROC_CFI(flush_data_cache_local)
 	.macro	tlb_unlock	la,flags,tmp
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	ldi		1,\tmp
+	sync
 	stw		\tmp,0(\la)
 	mtsm		\flags
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/syscall.S b/arch/parisc/kernel/syscall.S
index e775f80ae28c..4886a6db42e9 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/syscall.S
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/syscall.S
@@ -633,6 +633,7 @@ cas_action:
 	sub,<>	%r28, %r25, %r0
 2:	stw,ma	%r24, 0(%r26)
 	/* Free lock */
+	sync
 	stw,ma	%r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
 #if ENABLE_LWS_DEBUG
 	/* Clear thread register indicator */
@@ -647,6 +648,7 @@ cas_action:
 3:		
 	/* Error occurred on load or store */
 	/* Free lock */
+	sync
 	stw	%r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
 #if ENABLE_LWS_DEBUG
 	stw	%r0, 4(%sr2,%r20)
@@ -848,6 +850,7 @@ cas2_action:
 
 cas2_end:
 	/* Free lock */
+	sync
 	stw,ma	%r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
 	/* Enable interrupts */
 	ssm	PSW_SM_I, %r0
@@ -858,6 +861,7 @@ cas2_end:
 22:
 	/* Error occurred on load or store */
 	/* Free lock */
+	sync
 	stw	%r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
 	ssm	PSW_SM_I, %r0
 	ldo	1(%r0),%r28
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index a4ac7bab15f7..e31001ec4c07 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_UID16			if X86_32 || IA32_EMULATION
 	select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
 	select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
+	select HOTPLUG_SMT			if SMP
 	select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA		if X86_64
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL		if X86_32
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
index f5aaf6c83222..2188b5af8167 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/mpspec.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/idle.h>
+#include <asm/hardirq.h>
 
 #define ARCH_APICTIMER_STOPS_ON_C3	1
 
@@ -633,6 +634,13 @@ extern int default_check_phys_apicid_present(int phys_apicid);
 #endif
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+bool apic_id_is_primary_thread(unsigned int id);
+#else
+static inline bool apic_id_is_primary_thread(unsigned int id) { return false; }
+#endif
+
 extern void irq_enter(void);
 extern void irq_exit(void);
 
@@ -640,6 +648,7 @@ static inline void entering_irq(void)
 {
 	irq_enter();
 	exit_idle();
+	kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
 }
 
 static inline void entering_ack_irq(void)
@@ -652,6 +661,7 @@ static inline void ipi_entering_ack_irq(void)
 {
 	irq_enter();
 	ack_APIC_irq();
+	kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
 }
 
 static inline void exiting_irq(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index aea30afeddb8..fbc1474960e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB	( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
 #define X86_FEATURE_STIBP	( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ZEN		( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
-
+#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV	( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW  ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D		(18*32+28) /* Flush L1D cache */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD	(18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
@@ -349,5 +350,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1	X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2	X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
 #define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
+#define X86_BUG_L1TF		X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/dmi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/dmi.h
index 3c69fed215c5..d8b95604a2e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/dmi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/dmi.h
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
 
-#include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 
 static __always_inline __init void *dmi_alloc(unsigned len)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h
index 9b76cd331990..987165924a32 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h
@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
 #define _ASM_X86_HARDIRQ_H
 
 #include <linux/threads.h>
-#include <linux/irq.h>
 
 typedef struct {
-	unsigned int __softirq_pending;
+	u16	     __softirq_pending;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+	u8	     kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d;
+#endif
 	unsigned int __nmi_count;	/* arch dependent */
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
 	unsigned int apic_timer_irqs;	/* arch dependent */
@@ -60,4 +62,24 @@ extern u64 arch_irq_stat_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
 extern u64 arch_irq_stat(void);
 #define arch_irq_stat		arch_irq_stat
 
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+static inline void kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d(void)
+{
+	__this_cpu_write(irq_stat.kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d, 1);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_clear_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d(void)
+{
+	__this_cpu_write(irq_stat.kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d, 0);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_get_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d(void)
+{
+	return __this_cpu_read(irq_stat.kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d);
+}
+#else /* !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) */
+static inline void kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d(void) { }
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) */
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_HARDIRQ_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h
index 8a8a6c66be9a..5b1177f5a963 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
  * Interrupt control:
  */
 
+/* Declaration required for gcc < 4.9 to prevent -Werror=missing-prototypes */
+extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void);
 extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 7598a6c26f76..22a0ccb17ad0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/tracepoint.h>
 #include <linux/cpumask.h>
 #include <linux/irq_work.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 
 #include <linux/kvm.h>
 #include <linux/kvm_para.h>
@@ -485,6 +486,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 	u64 smbase;
 	bool tpr_access_reporting;
 	u64 ia32_xss;
+	u64 microcode_version;
 
 	/*
 	 * Paging state of the vcpu
@@ -659,6 +661,9 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 
 	int pending_ioapic_eoi;
 	int pending_external_vector;
+
+	/* Flush the L1 Data cache for L1TF mitigation on VMENTER */
+	bool l1tf_flush_l1d;
 };
 
 struct kvm_lpage_info {
@@ -819,6 +824,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_stat {
 	u64 signal_exits;
 	u64 irq_window_exits;
 	u64 nmi_window_exits;
+	u64 l1d_flush;
 	u64 halt_exits;
 	u64 halt_successful_poll;
 	u64 halt_attempted_poll;
@@ -1020,6 +1026,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	void (*cancel_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 	void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+	int (*get_msr_feature)(struct kvm_msr_entry *entry);
 };
 
 struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
@@ -1338,6 +1346,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_page(struct kvm *kvm,
 					   unsigned long address);
 
+u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void);
 void kvm_define_shared_msr(unsigned index, u32 msr);
 int kvm_set_shared_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 1ec13e253174..bbbb9b14ade1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -63,12 +63,19 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		(1 << 0)   /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		(1 << 1)   /* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	(1 << 3)   /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			(1 << 4)   /*
 						    * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
 						    * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
 						    * control required.
 						    */
 
+#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
+#define L1D_FLUSH			(1 << 0)   /*
+						    * Writeback and invalidate the
+						    * L1 data cache.
+						    */
+
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3		0x0000011e
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h
index 3bae4969ac65..2622984b8f1c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h
@@ -28,8 +28,13 @@
 #define N_EXCEPTION_STACKS 1
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
-/* 44=32+12, the limit we can fit into an unsigned long pfn */
-#define __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT	44
+/*
+ * This is beyond the 44 bit limit imposed by the 32bit long pfns,
+ * but we need the full mask to make sure inverted PROT_NONE
+ * entries have all the host bits set in a guest.
+ * The real limit is still 44 bits.
+ */
+#define __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT	52
 #define __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT	32
 
 #else  /* !CONFIG_X86_PAE */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level.h
index fd74a11959de..89c50332a71e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level.h
@@ -77,4 +77,21 @@ static inline unsigned long pte_bitop(unsigned long value, unsigned int rightshi
 #define __pte_to_swp_entry(pte)		((swp_entry_t) { (pte).pte_low })
 #define __swp_entry_to_pte(x)		((pte_t) { .pte = (x).val })
 
+/* No inverted PFNs on 2 level page tables */
+
+static inline u64 protnone_mask(u64 val)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard(u64 oldval, u64 val, u64 mask)
+{
+	return val;
+}
+
+static inline bool __pte_needs_invert(u64 val)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_2LEVEL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
index cdaa58c9b39e..5c686382d84b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
@@ -177,11 +177,44 @@ static inline pmd_t native_pmdp_get_and_clear(pmd_t *pmdp)
 #endif
 
 /* Encode and de-code a swap entry */
+#define SWP_TYPE_BITS		5
+
+#define SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT	(_PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE + 1)
+
+/* We always extract/encode the offset by shifting it all the way up, and then down again */
+#define SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT	(SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT + SWP_TYPE_BITS)
+
 #define MAX_SWAPFILES_CHECK() BUILD_BUG_ON(MAX_SWAPFILES_SHIFT > 5)
 #define __swp_type(x)			(((x).val) & 0x1f)
 #define __swp_offset(x)			((x).val >> 5)
 #define __swp_entry(type, offset)	((swp_entry_t){(type) | (offset) << 5})
-#define __pte_to_swp_entry(pte)		((swp_entry_t){ (pte).pte_high })
-#define __swp_entry_to_pte(x)		((pte_t){ { .pte_high = (x).val } })
+
+/*
+ * Normally, __swp_entry() converts from arch-independent swp_entry_t to
+ * arch-dependent swp_entry_t, and __swp_entry_to_pte() just stores the result
+ * to pte. But here we have 32bit swp_entry_t and 64bit pte, and need to use the
+ * whole 64 bits. Thus, we shift the "real" arch-dependent conversion to
+ * __swp_entry_to_pte() through the following helper macro based on 64bit
+ * __swp_entry().
+ */
+#define __swp_pteval_entry(type, offset) ((pteval_t) { \
+	(~(pteval_t)(offset) << SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT >> SWP_TYPE_BITS) \
+	| ((pteval_t)(type) << (64 - SWP_TYPE_BITS)) })
+
+#define __swp_entry_to_pte(x)	((pte_t){ .pte = \
+		__swp_pteval_entry(__swp_type(x), __swp_offset(x)) })
+/*
+ * Analogically, __pte_to_swp_entry() doesn't just extract the arch-dependent
+ * swp_entry_t, but also has to convert it from 64bit to the 32bit
+ * intermediate representation, using the following macros based on 64bit
+ * __swp_type() and __swp_offset().
+ */
+#define __pteval_swp_type(x) ((unsigned long)((x).pte >> (64 - SWP_TYPE_BITS)))
+#define __pteval_swp_offset(x) ((unsigned long)(~((x).pte) << SWP_TYPE_BITS >> SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT))
+
+#define __pte_to_swp_entry(pte)	(__swp_entry(__pteval_swp_type(pte), \
+					     __pteval_swp_offset(pte)))
+
+#include <asm/pgtable-invert.h>
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_3LEVEL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-invert.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-invert.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..44b1203ece12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-invert.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_PGTABLE_INVERT_H
+#define _ASM_PGTABLE_INVERT_H 1
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+static inline bool __pte_needs_invert(u64 val)
+{
+	return !(val & _PAGE_PRESENT);
+}
+
+/* Get a mask to xor with the page table entry to get the correct pfn. */
+static inline u64 protnone_mask(u64 val)
+{
+	return __pte_needs_invert(val) ?  ~0ull : 0;
+}
+
+static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard(u64 oldval, u64 val, u64 mask)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When a PTE transitions from NONE to !NONE or vice-versa
+	 * invert the PFN part to stop speculation.
+	 * pte_pfn undoes this when needed.
+	 */
+	if (__pte_needs_invert(oldval) != __pte_needs_invert(val))
+		val = (val & ~mask) | (~val & mask);
+	return val;
+}
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 5af0401ccff2..5008be1ab183 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -165,19 +165,29 @@ static inline int pte_special(pte_t pte)
 	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_SPECIAL;
 }
 
+/* Entries that were set to PROT_NONE are inverted */
+
+static inline u64 protnone_mask(u64 val);
+
 static inline unsigned long pte_pfn(pte_t pte)
 {
-	return (pte_val(pte) & PTE_PFN_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	phys_addr_t pfn = pte_val(pte);
+	pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
+	return (pfn & PTE_PFN_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long pmd_pfn(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return (pmd_val(pmd) & pmd_pfn_mask(pmd)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	phys_addr_t pfn = pmd_val(pmd);
+	pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
+	return (pfn & pmd_pfn_mask(pmd)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long pud_pfn(pud_t pud)
 {
-	return (pud_val(pud) & pud_pfn_mask(pud)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	phys_addr_t pfn = pud_val(pud);
+	pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
+	return (pfn & pud_pfn_mask(pud)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 }
 
 #define pte_page(pte)	pfn_to_page(pte_pfn(pte))
@@ -340,11 +350,6 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd)
 	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
 }
 
-static inline pmd_t pmd_mknotpresent(pmd_t pmd)
-{
-	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_PROTNONE);
-}
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
 static inline int pte_soft_dirty(pte_t pte)
 {
@@ -394,19 +399,58 @@ static inline pgprotval_t massage_pgprot(pgprot_t pgprot)
 
 static inline pte_t pfn_pte(unsigned long page_nr, pgprot_t pgprot)
 {
-	return __pte(((phys_addr_t)page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT) |
-		     massage_pgprot(pgprot));
+	phys_addr_t pfn = (phys_addr_t)page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	pfn ^= protnone_mask(pgprot_val(pgprot));
+	pfn &= PTE_PFN_MASK;
+	return __pte(pfn | massage_pgprot(pgprot));
 }
 
 static inline pmd_t pfn_pmd(unsigned long page_nr, pgprot_t pgprot)
 {
-	return __pmd(((phys_addr_t)page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT) |
-		     massage_pgprot(pgprot));
+	phys_addr_t pfn = (phys_addr_t)page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	pfn ^= protnone_mask(pgprot_val(pgprot));
+	pfn &= PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK;
+	return __pmd(pfn | massage_pgprot(pgprot));
+}
+
+static inline pud_t pfn_pud(unsigned long page_nr, pgprot_t pgprot)
+{
+	phys_addr_t pfn = page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	pfn ^= protnone_mask(pgprot_val(pgprot));
+	pfn &= PHYSICAL_PUD_PAGE_MASK;
+	return __pud(pfn | massage_pgprot(pgprot));
+}
+
+static inline pmd_t pmd_mknotpresent(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	return pfn_pmd(pmd_pfn(pmd),
+		       __pgprot(pmd_flags(pmd) & ~(_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_PROTNONE)));
+}
+
+static inline pud_t pud_set_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t set)
+{
+	pudval_t v = native_pud_val(pud);
+
+	return __pud(v | set);
+}
+
+static inline pud_t pud_clear_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t clear)
+{
+	pudval_t v = native_pud_val(pud);
+
+	return __pud(v & ~clear);
+}
+
+static inline pud_t pud_mkhuge(pud_t pud)
+{
+	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_PSE);
 }
 
+static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard(u64 oldval, u64 val, u64 mask);
+
 static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)
 {
-	pteval_t val = pte_val(pte);
+	pteval_t val = pte_val(pte), oldval = val;
 
 	/*
 	 * Chop off the NX bit (if present), and add the NX portion of
@@ -414,17 +458,17 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)
 	 */
 	val &= _PAGE_CHG_MASK;
 	val |= massage_pgprot(newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK;
-
+	val = flip_protnone_guard(oldval, val, PTE_PFN_MASK);
 	return __pte(val);
 }
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_modify(pmd_t pmd, pgprot_t newprot)
 {
-	pmdval_t val = pmd_val(pmd);
+	pmdval_t val = pmd_val(pmd), oldval = val;
 
 	val &= _HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
 	val |= massage_pgprot(newprot) & ~_HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
-
+	val = flip_protnone_guard(oldval, val, PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK);
 	return __pmd(val);
 }
 
@@ -1010,6 +1054,15 @@ static inline u16 pte_flags_pkey(unsigned long pte_flags)
 #endif
 }
 
+
+#define __HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED 1
+extern bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot);
+
+static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
+{
+	return boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
+}
+
 #include <asm-generic/pgtable.h>
 #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
index ce97c8c6a310..221a32ed1372 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
@@ -166,29 +166,49 @@ static inline int pgd_large(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; }
 /*
  * Encode and de-code a swap entry
  *
- * |     ...            | 11| 10|  9|8|7|6|5| 4| 3|2|1|0| <- bit number
- * |     ...            |SW3|SW2|SW1|G|L|D|A|CD|WT|U|W|P| <- bit names
- * | OFFSET (14->63) | TYPE (9-13)  |0|X|X|X| X| X|X|X|0| <- swp entry
+ * |     ...            | 11| 10|  9|8|7|6|5| 4| 3|2| 1|0| <- bit number
+ * |     ...            |SW3|SW2|SW1|G|L|D|A|CD|WT|U| W|P| <- bit names
+ * | TYPE (59-63) | ~OFFSET (9-58)  |0|0|X|X| X| X|X|SD|0| <- swp entry
  *
  * G (8) is aliased and used as a PROT_NONE indicator for
  * !present ptes.  We need to start storing swap entries above
  * there.  We also need to avoid using A and D because of an
  * erratum where they can be incorrectly set by hardware on
  * non-present PTEs.
+ *
+ * SD (1) in swp entry is used to store soft dirty bit, which helps us
+ * remember soft dirty over page migration
+ *
+ * Bit 7 in swp entry should be 0 because pmd_present checks not only P,
+ * but also L and G.
+ *
+ * The offset is inverted by a binary not operation to make the high
+ * physical bits set.
  */
-#define SWP_TYPE_FIRST_BIT (_PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE + 1)
-#define SWP_TYPE_BITS 5
-/* Place the offset above the type: */
-#define SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT (SWP_TYPE_FIRST_BIT + SWP_TYPE_BITS)
+#define SWP_TYPE_BITS		5
+
+#define SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT	(_PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE + 1)
+
+/* We always extract/encode the offset by shifting it all the way up, and then down again */
+#define SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT	(SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT+SWP_TYPE_BITS)
 
 #define MAX_SWAPFILES_CHECK() BUILD_BUG_ON(MAX_SWAPFILES_SHIFT > SWP_TYPE_BITS)
 
-#define __swp_type(x)			(((x).val >> (SWP_TYPE_FIRST_BIT)) \
-					 & ((1U << SWP_TYPE_BITS) - 1))
-#define __swp_offset(x)			((x).val >> SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT)
-#define __swp_entry(type, offset)	((swp_entry_t) { \
-					 ((type) << (SWP_TYPE_FIRST_BIT)) \
-					 | ((offset) << SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT) })
+/* Extract the high bits for type */
+#define __swp_type(x) ((x).val >> (64 - SWP_TYPE_BITS))
+
+/* Shift up (to get rid of type), then down to get value */
+#define __swp_offset(x) (~(x).val << SWP_TYPE_BITS >> SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT)
+
+/*
+ * Shift the offset up "too far" by TYPE bits, then down again
+ * The offset is inverted by a binary not operation to make the high
+ * physical bits set.
+ */
+#define __swp_entry(type, offset) ((swp_entry_t) { \
+	(~(unsigned long)(offset) << SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT >> SWP_TYPE_BITS) \
+	| ((unsigned long)(type) << (64-SWP_TYPE_BITS)) })
+
 #define __pte_to_swp_entry(pte)		((swp_entry_t) { pte_val((pte)) })
 #define __swp_entry_to_pte(x)		((pte_t) { .pte = (x).val })
 
@@ -215,6 +235,8 @@ extern void cleanup_highmap(void);
 extern void init_extra_mapping_uc(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size);
 extern void init_extra_mapping_wb(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size);
 
+#include <asm/pgtable-invert.h>
+
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_64_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index f1c8ac468292..dfdb7e21ba56 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -97,15 +97,15 @@
 /*
  * Tracking soft dirty bit when a page goes to a swap is tricky.
  * We need a bit which can be stored in pte _and_ not conflict
- * with swap entry format. On x86 bits 6 and 7 are *not* involved
- * into swap entry computation, but bit 6 is used for nonlinear
- * file mapping, so we borrow bit 7 for soft dirty tracking.
+ * with swap entry format. On x86 bits 1-4 are *not* involved
+ * into swap entry computation, but bit 7 is used for thp migration,
+ * so we borrow bit 1 for soft dirty tracking.
  *
  * Please note that this bit must be treated as swap dirty page
- * mark if and only if the PTE has present bit clear!
+ * mark if and only if the PTE/PMD has present bit clear!
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY
-#define _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY	_PAGE_PSE
+#define _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY	_PAGE_RW
 #else
 #define _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index ec15ca2b32d0..d5525a7e119e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ extern const struct seq_operations cpuinfo_op;
 
 extern void cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 
+static inline unsigned long l1tf_pfn_limit(void)
+{
+	return BIT(boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits - 1 - PAGE_SHIFT) - 1;
+}
+
 extern void early_cpu_init(void);
 extern void identify_boot_cpu(void);
 extern void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);
@@ -855,4 +860,16 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void);
 
 void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy);
 void df_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+
+enum l1tf_mitigations {
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE
+};
+
+extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation;
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
index 026ea82ecc60..d25fb6beb2f0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
@@ -156,7 +156,6 @@ static inline int wbinvd_on_all_cpus(void)
 	wbinvd();
 	return 0;
 }
-#define smp_num_siblings	1
 #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
 
 extern unsigned disabled_cpus;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h
index cf75871d2f81..1fbb174c846b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h
@@ -129,13 +129,17 @@ static inline int topology_max_smt_threads(void)
 }
 
 int topology_update_package_map(unsigned int apicid, unsigned int cpu);
-extern int topology_phys_to_logical_pkg(unsigned int pkg);
+int topology_phys_to_logical_pkg(unsigned int pkg);
+bool topology_is_primary_thread(unsigned int cpu);
+bool topology_smt_supported(void);
 #else
 #define topology_max_packages()			(1)
 static inline int
 topology_update_package_map(unsigned int apicid, unsigned int cpu) { return 0; }
 static inline int topology_phys_to_logical_pkg(unsigned int pkg) { return 0; }
 static inline int topology_max_smt_threads(void) { return 1; }
+static inline bool topology_is_primary_thread(unsigned int cpu) { return true; }
+static inline bool topology_smt_supported(void) { return false; }
 #endif
 
 static inline void arch_fix_phys_package_id(int num, u32 slot)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 9cbfbef6a115..72cacb027b98 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -499,4 +499,15 @@ enum vm_instruction_error_number {
 	VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID = 28,
 };
 
+enum vmx_l1d_flush_state {
+	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO,
+	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER,
+	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND,
+	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS,
+	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED,
+	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED,
+};
+
+extern enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation;
+
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index 76cf21f887bd..4f2af1ee09cb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <linux/dmi.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 
 #include <asm/trace/irq_vectors.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@
 #include <asm/mce.h>
 #include <asm/tsc.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
 
 unsigned int num_processors;
 
@@ -2041,6 +2043,23 @@ static int cpuid_to_apicid[] = {
 	[0 ... NR_CPUS - 1] = -1,
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+/**
+ * apic_id_is_primary_thread - Check whether APIC ID belongs to a primary thread
+ * @id:	APIC ID to check
+ */
+bool apic_id_is_primary_thread(unsigned int apicid)
+{
+	u32 mask;
+
+	if (smp_num_siblings == 1)
+		return true;
+	/* Isolate the SMT bit(s) in the APICID and check for 0 */
+	mask = (1U << (fls(smp_num_siblings) - 1)) - 1;
+	return !(apicid & mask);
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Should use this API to allocate logical CPU IDs to keep nr_logical_cpuids
  * and cpuid_to_apicid[] synchronized.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/htirq.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/htirq.c
index ae50d3454d78..89d6e96d0038 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/htirq.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/htirq.c
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
 #include <linux/device.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/htirq.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
+
 #include <asm/irqdomain.h>
 #include <asm/hw_irq.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
index cf89928dbd46..d34629d70421 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c
index 015bbf30e3e3..cfd17a3518bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/dmar.h>
 #include <linux/hpet.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
index 4922ab66fd29..c6bd3f9b4383 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
  * published by the Free Software Foundation.
  */
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 4c2be99fa0fb..4c2648b96c9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -296,13 +296,34 @@ static int nearby_node(int apicid)
 }
 #endif
 
+static void amd_get_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT))
+		smp_num_siblings = ((cpuid_ebx(0x8000001e) >> 8) & 0xff) + 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fix up cpu_core_id for pre-F17h systems to be in the
+ * [0 .. cores_per_node - 1] range. Not really needed but
+ * kept so as not to break existing setups.
+ */
+static void legacy_fixup_core_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	u32 cus_per_node;
+
+	if (c->x86 >= 0x17)
+		return;
+
+	cus_per_node = c->x86_max_cores / nodes_per_socket;
+	c->cpu_core_id %= cus_per_node;
+}
+
 /*
  * Fixup core topology information for
  * (1) AMD multi-node processors
  *     Assumption: Number of cores in each internal node is the same.
  * (2) AMD processors supporting compute units
  */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u8 node_id;
@@ -315,7 +336,6 @@ static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		cpuid(0x8000001e, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
 
 		node_id  = ecx & 0xff;
-		smp_num_siblings = ((ebx >> 8) & 0xff) + 1;
 
 		if (c->x86 == 0x15)
 			c->cu_id = ebx & 0xff;
@@ -353,18 +373,11 @@ static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	} else
 		return;
 
-	/* fixup multi-node processor information */
 	if (nodes_per_socket > 1) {
-		u32 cus_per_node;
-
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM);
-		cus_per_node = c->x86_max_cores / nodes_per_socket;
-
-		/* core id has to be in the [0 .. cores_per_node - 1] range */
-		c->cpu_core_id %= cus_per_node;
+		legacy_fixup_core_id(c);
 	}
 }
-#endif
 
 /*
  * On a AMD dual core setup the lower bits of the APIC id distinguish the cores.
@@ -372,7 +385,6 @@ static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
  */
 static void amd_detect_cmp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	unsigned bits;
 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
 
@@ -384,16 +396,11 @@ static void amd_detect_cmp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	/* use socket ID also for last level cache */
 	per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->phys_proc_id;
 	amd_get_topology(c);
-#endif
 }
 
 u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu)
 {
-	u16 id = 0;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-	id = per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu);
-#endif
-	return id;
+	return per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_get_nb_id);
 
@@ -567,6 +574,8 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
+	u64 value;
+
 	early_init_amd_mc(c);
 
 	/*
@@ -633,6 +642,23 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	 */
 	if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_400))
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
+
+
+	/* Re-enable TopologyExtensions if switched off by BIOS */
+	if (c->x86 == 0x15 &&
+	    (c->x86_model >= 0x10 && c->x86_model <= 0x6f) &&
+	    !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT)) {
+
+		if (msr_set_bit(0xc0011005, 54) > 0) {
+			rdmsrl(0xc0011005, value);
+			if (value & BIT_64(54)) {
+				set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT);
+				pr_info_once(FW_INFO "CPU: Re-enabling disabled Topology Extensions Support.\n");
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	amd_get_topology_early(c);
 }
 
 static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -724,19 +750,6 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 value;
 
-	/* re-enable TopologyExtensions if switched off by BIOS */
-	if ((c->x86_model >= 0x10) && (c->x86_model <= 0x6f) &&
-	    !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT)) {
-
-		if (msr_set_bit(0xc0011005, 54) > 0) {
-			rdmsrl(0xc0011005, value);
-			if (value & BIT_64(54)) {
-				set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT);
-				pr_info_once(FW_INFO "CPU: Re-enabling disabled Topology Extensions Support.\n");
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * The way access filter has a performance penalty on some workloads.
 	 * Disable it on the affected CPUs.
@@ -799,15 +812,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	cpu_detect_cache_sizes(c);
 
-	/* Multi core CPU? */
-	if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008) {
-		amd_detect_cmp(c);
-		srat_detect_node(c);
-	}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-	detect_ht(c);
-#endif
+	amd_detect_cmp(c);
+	srat_detect_node(c);
 
 	init_amd_cacheinfo(c);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 86af9b1b049d..5229eaf73828 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -21,14 +21,17 @@
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
 #include <asm/paravirt.h>
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/e820.h>
 
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /*
  * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
@@ -54,6 +57,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	identify_boot_cpu();
 
+	/*
+	 * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
+	 * core code know.
+	 */
+	cpu_smt_check_topology_early();
+
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
 		pr_info("CPU: ");
 		print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
@@ -80,6 +89,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	 */
 	ssb_select_mitigation();
 
+	l1tf_select_mitigation();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
 	 * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -310,23 +321,6 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	return cmd;
 }
 
-/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
-static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
-{
-	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
-	    boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
-		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
-		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
-			return true;
-		}
-	}
-	return false;
-}
-
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -387,22 +381,15 @@ retpoline_auto:
 	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
 
 	/*
-	 * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
-	 * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
-	 * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
-	 * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
+	 * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
+	 * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
+	 * issues:
 	 *
-	 * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
-	 * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
-	 * The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
-	 * or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
-	 * switch is required.
+	 *	- RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
+	 *	- SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
 	 */
-	if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER) &&
-	     !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
-		pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
-	}
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
 
 	/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
@@ -653,8 +640,121 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 		x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"L1TF: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
+enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
+
+enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
+#endif
+
+static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	u64 half_pa;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return;
+
+	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		break;
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		cpu_smt_disable(false);
+		break;
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+		cpu_smt_disable(true);
+		break;
+	}
+
+#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 2
+	pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No mitigation for L1TF\n");
+	return;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * This is extremely unlikely to happen because almost all
+	 * systems have far more MAX_PA/2 than RAM can be fit into
+	 * DIMM slots.
+	 */
+	half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	if (e820_any_mapped(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_RAM)) {
+		pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
+}
+
+static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nowarn"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "flush"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nosmt"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full,force"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
+#define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+static const char *l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO]		= "auto",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER]		= "vulnerable",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND]		= "conditional cache flushes",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS]		= "cache flushes",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED]	= "EPT disabled",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED]	= "flush not necessary"
+};
+
+static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
+
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
+	    (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
+	     cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED))
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+			       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+		       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
+		       cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+#else
+static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
+}
+#endif
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
@@ -680,6 +780,10 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 	case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
 		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
 
+	case X86_BUG_L1TF:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
+			return l1tf_show_state(buf);
+		break;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -706,4 +810,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
+}
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 7a4279d8a902..13471b71bec7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -61,6 +61,13 @@ cpumask_var_t cpu_callin_mask;
 /* representing cpus for which sibling maps can be computed */
 cpumask_var_t cpu_sibling_setup_mask;
 
+/* Number of siblings per CPU package */
+int smp_num_siblings = 1;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(smp_num_siblings);
+
+/* Last level cache ID of each logical CPU */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u16, cpu_llc_id) = BAD_APICID;
+
 /* correctly size the local cpu masks */
 void __init setup_cpu_local_masks(void)
 {
@@ -606,33 +613,36 @@ static void cpu_detect_tlb(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES], tlb_lld_1g[ENTRIES]);
 }
 
-void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
-	int index_msb, core_bits;
-	static bool printed;
 
 	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HT))
-		return;
+		return -1;
 
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY))
-		goto out;
+		return -1;
 
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY))
-		return;
+		return -1;
 
 	cpuid(1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
 
 	smp_num_siblings = (ebx & 0xff0000) >> 16;
-
-	if (smp_num_siblings == 1) {
+	if (smp_num_siblings == 1)
 		pr_info_once("CPU0: Hyper-Threading is disabled\n");
-		goto out;
-	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
 
-	if (smp_num_siblings <= 1)
-		goto out;
+void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+	int index_msb, core_bits;
+
+	if (detect_ht_early(c) < 0)
+		return;
 
 	index_msb = get_count_order(smp_num_siblings);
 	c->phys_proc_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, index_msb);
@@ -645,15 +655,6 @@ void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	c->cpu_core_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, index_msb) &
 				       ((1 << core_bits) - 1);
-
-out:
-	if (!printed && (c->x86_max_cores * smp_num_siblings) > 1) {
-		pr_info("CPU: Physical Processor ID: %d\n",
-			c->phys_proc_id);
-		pr_info("CPU: Processor Core ID: %d\n",
-			c->cpu_core_id);
-		printed = 1;
-	}
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -925,6 +926,21 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_spec_store_bypass[] = {
 	{}
 };
 
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_l1tf[] = {
+	/* in addition to cpu_no_speculation */
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT		},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		},
+	{}
+};
+
 static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
@@ -950,6 +966,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+
+	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_l1tf))
+		return;
+
+	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
index 3b19d82f7932..2275900d4d1b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[],
 
 extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 93781e3f05b2..9ad86c4bf360 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -283,6 +283,13 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	}
 
 	check_mpx_erratum(c);
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the number of SMT siblings early from the extended topology
+	 * leaf, if available. Otherwise try the legacy SMT detection.
+	 */
+	if (detect_extended_topology_early(c) < 0)
+		detect_ht_early(c);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
index 0afaf00b029b..b53a6579767d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
@@ -384,6 +384,24 @@ static void __exit microcode_dev_exit(void)
 /* fake device for request_firmware */
 static struct platform_device	*microcode_pdev;
 
+static int check_online_cpus(void)
+{
+	unsigned int cpu;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure all CPUs are online.  It's fine for SMT to be disabled if
+	 * all the primary threads are still online.
+	 */
+	for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
+		if (topology_is_primary_thread(cpu) && !cpu_online(cpu)) {
+			pr_err("Not all CPUs online, aborting microcode update.\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int reload_for_cpu(int cpu)
 {
 	struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
@@ -418,7 +436,13 @@ static ssize_t reload_store(struct device *dev,
 		return size;
 
 	get_online_cpus();
+
+	ret = check_online_cpus();
+	if (ret)
+		goto put;
+
 	mutex_lock(&microcode_mutex);
+
 	for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
 		tmp_ret = reload_for_cpu(cpu);
 		if (tmp_ret != 0)
@@ -431,6 +455,8 @@ static ssize_t reload_store(struct device *dev,
 	if (!ret)
 		perf_check_microcode();
 	mutex_unlock(&microcode_mutex);
+
+put:
 	put_online_cpus();
 
 	if (!ret)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
index cd531355e838..6b5a850885ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
@@ -26,16 +26,13 @@
  * exists, use it for populating initial_apicid and cpu topology
  * detection.
  */
-void detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sub_index;
-	unsigned int ht_mask_width, core_plus_mask_width;
-	unsigned int core_select_mask, core_level_siblings;
-	static bool printed;
+	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
 
 	if (c->cpuid_level < 0xb)
-		return;
+		return -1;
 
 	cpuid_count(0xb, SMT_LEVEL, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
 
@@ -43,7 +40,7 @@ void detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	 * check if the cpuid leaf 0xb is actually implemented.
 	 */
 	if (ebx == 0 || (LEAFB_SUBTYPE(ecx) != SMT_TYPE))
-		return;
+		return -1;
 
 	set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY);
 
@@ -51,10 +48,30 @@ void detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	 * initial apic id, which also represents 32-bit extended x2apic id.
 	 */
 	c->initial_apicid = edx;
+	smp_num_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx);
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check for extended topology enumeration cpuid leaf 0xb and if it
+ * exists, use it for populating initial_apicid and cpu topology
+ * detection.
+ */
+void detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sub_index;
+	unsigned int ht_mask_width, core_plus_mask_width;
+	unsigned int core_select_mask, core_level_siblings;
+
+	if (detect_extended_topology_early(c) < 0)
+		return;
 
 	/*
 	 * Populate HT related information from sub-leaf level 0.
 	 */
+	cpuid_count(0xb, SMT_LEVEL, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
 	core_level_siblings = smp_num_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx);
 	core_plus_mask_width = ht_mask_width = BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax);
 
@@ -85,15 +102,5 @@ void detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	c->apicid = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, 0);
 
 	c->x86_max_cores = (core_level_siblings / smp_num_siblings);
-
-	if (!printed) {
-		pr_info("CPU: Physical Processor ID: %d\n",
-		       c->phys_proc_id);
-		if (c->x86_max_cores > 1)
-			pr_info("CPU: Processor Core ID: %d\n",
-			       c->cpu_core_id);
-		printed = 1;
-	}
-	return;
 #endif
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index 96d80dfac383..430c095cfa0e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <asm/fpu/signal.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/types.h>
 #include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
 
 #include <linux/hardirq.h>
 #include <linux/pkeys.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 6bf09f5594b2..5e06ffefc5db 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/kprobes.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
 #include <asm/ftrace.h>
 #include <asm/nops.h>
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
index 9512529e8eab..756634f14df6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #include <linux/clocksource.h>
 #include <linux/clockchips.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c b/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c
index 4e3b8a587c88..26d5451b6b42 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/ioport.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 #include <linux/timex.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
index 8a7ad9fb22c1..c6f0ef1d9ab7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/io_apic.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
index 2763573ee1d2..5aaa39a10823 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 #include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
 #include <linux/notifier.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
index 9ebd0b0e73d9..bcd1b82c86e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
index f480b38a03c3..eeb77e5e5179 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/ioport.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 #include <linux/timex.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index 516be613bd41..64a70b2e2285 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/insn.h>
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
 
 #include "common.h"
 
@@ -396,7 +397,6 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src)
 		newdisp = (u8 *) src + (s64) insn.displacement.value - (u8 *) dest;
 		if ((s64) (s32) newdisp != newdisp) {
 			pr_err("Kprobes error: new displacement does not fit into s32 (%llx)\n", newdisp);
-			pr_err("\tSrc: %p, Dest: %p, old disp: %x\n", src, dest, insn.displacement.value);
 			return 0;
 		}
 		disp = (u8 *) dest + insn_offset_displacement(&insn);
@@ -612,8 +612,7 @@ static int reenter_kprobe(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs,
 		 * Raise a BUG or we'll continue in an endless reentering loop
 		 * and eventually a stack overflow.
 		 */
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "Unrecoverable kprobe detected at %p.\n",
-		       p->addr);
+		pr_err("Unrecoverable kprobe detected.\n");
 		dump_kprobe(p);
 		BUG();
 	default:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
index 1808a9cc7701..1009d63a2b79 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <asm/insn.h>
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
 
 #include "common.h"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c
index bbf3d5933eaa..29d465627919 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c
@@ -88,10 +88,12 @@ unsigned paravirt_patch_call(void *insnbuf,
 	struct branch *b = insnbuf;
 	unsigned long delta = (unsigned long)target - (addr+5);
 
-	if (tgt_clobbers & ~site_clobbers)
-		return len;	/* target would clobber too much for this site */
-	if (len < 5)
+	if (len < 5) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+		WARN_ONCE("Failing to patch indirect CALL in %ps\n", (void *)addr);
+#endif
 		return len;	/* call too long for patch site */
+	}
 
 	b->opcode = 0xe8; /* call */
 	b->delta = delta;
@@ -106,8 +108,12 @@ unsigned paravirt_patch_jmp(void *insnbuf, const void *target,
 	struct branch *b = insnbuf;
 	unsigned long delta = (unsigned long)target - (addr+5);
 
-	if (len < 5)
+	if (len < 5) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+		WARN_ONCE("Failing to patch indirect JMP in %ps\n", (void *)addr);
+#endif
 		return len;	/* call too long for patch site */
+	}
 
 	b->opcode = 0xe9;	/* jmp */
 	b->delta = delta;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 6b55012d02a3..49960ecfc322 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -854,6 +854,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 	memblock_reserve(__pa_symbol(_text),
 			 (unsigned long)__bss_stop - (unsigned long)_text);
 
+	/*
+	 * Make sure page 0 is always reserved because on systems with
+	 * L1TF its contents can be leaked to user processes.
+	 */
+	memblock_reserve(0, PAGE_SIZE);
+
 	early_reserve_initrd();
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c
index ea217caa731c..2863ad306692 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c
@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ __visible void __irq_entry smp_reschedule_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	/*
 	 * KVM uses this interrupt to force a cpu out of guest mode
 	 */
+	kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
 }
 
 __visible void __irq_entry smp_trace_reschedule_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index 10b22fc6ef5a..ef38bc1d1c00 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -76,13 +76,7 @@
 #include <asm/realmode.h>
 #include <asm/misc.h>
 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
-
-/* Number of siblings per CPU package */
-int smp_num_siblings = 1;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(smp_num_siblings);
-
-/* Last level cache ID of each logical CPU */
-DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u16, cpu_llc_id) = BAD_APICID;
+#include <asm/hw_irq.h>
 
 /* representing HT siblings of each logical CPU */
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(cpumask_var_t, cpu_sibling_map);
@@ -295,6 +289,23 @@ found:
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * topology_is_primary_thread - Check whether CPU is the primary SMT thread
+ * @cpu:	CPU to check
+ */
+bool topology_is_primary_thread(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	return apic_id_is_primary_thread(per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_apicid, cpu));
+}
+
+/**
+ * topology_smt_supported - Check whether SMT is supported by the CPUs
+ */
+bool topology_smt_supported(void)
+{
+	return smp_num_siblings > 1;
+}
+
 /**
  * topology_phys_to_logical_pkg - Map a physical package id to a logical
  *
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/time.c b/arch/x86/kernel/time.c
index d39c09119db6..f8a0518d2810 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/time.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/time.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/clockchips.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
 #include <linux/i8253.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index c4cd1280ac3e..c855080c7a71 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
 	uint64_t sysenter_eip;
 	uint64_t tsc_aux;
 
+	u64 msr_decfg;
+
 	u64 next_rip;
 
 	u64 host_user_msrs[NR_HOST_SAVE_USER_MSRS];
@@ -1567,6 +1569,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	u32 dummy;
 	u32 eax = 1;
 
+	vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x01000065;
 	svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
 	svm->virt_spec_ctrl = 0;
 
@@ -2124,6 +2127,8 @@ static int pf_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	u32 error_code;
 	int r = 1;
 
+	svm->vcpu.arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
+
 	switch (svm->apf_reason) {
 	default:
 		error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
@@ -3483,6 +3488,22 @@ static int cr8_write_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int svm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
+{
+	msr->data = 0;
+
+	switch (msr->index) {
+	case MSR_F10H_DECFG:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC))
+			msr->data |= MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
@@ -3565,9 +3586,6 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 
 		msr_info->data = svm->virt_spec_ctrl;
 		break;
-	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
-		msr_info->data = 0x01000065;
-		break;
 	case MSR_F15H_IC_CFG: {
 
 		int family, model;
@@ -3585,6 +3603,9 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 			msr_info->data = 0x1E;
 		}
 		break;
+	case MSR_F10H_DECFG:
+		msr_info->data = svm->msr_decfg;
+		break;
 	default:
 		return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
 	}
@@ -3773,6 +3794,24 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 	case MSR_VM_IGNNE:
 		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented wrmsr: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", ecx, data);
 		break;
+	case MSR_F10H_DECFG: {
+		struct kvm_msr_entry msr_entry;
+
+		msr_entry.index = msr->index;
+		if (svm_get_msr_feature(&msr_entry))
+			return 1;
+
+		/* Check the supported bits */
+		if (data & ~msr_entry.data)
+			return 1;
+
+		/* Don't allow the guest to change a bit, #GP */
+		if (!msr->host_initiated && (data ^ msr_entry.data))
+			return 1;
+
+		svm->msr_decfg = data;
+		break;
+	}
 	case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
 		if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
 			avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data);
@@ -5502,6 +5541,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
 	.vcpu_unblocking = svm_vcpu_unblocking,
 
 	.update_bp_intercept = update_bp_intercept,
+	.get_msr_feature = svm_get_msr_feature,
 	.get_msr = svm_get_msr,
 	.set_msr = svm_set_msr,
 	.get_segment_base = svm_get_segment_base,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 30b74b491909..12826607a995 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -189,6 +189,150 @@ module_param(ple_window_max, int, S_IRUGO);
 
 extern const ulong vmx_return;
 
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+
+/* Storage for pre module init parameter parsing */
+static enum vmx_l1d_flush_state __read_mostly vmentry_l1d_flush_param = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+
+static const struct {
+	const char *option;
+	enum vmx_l1d_flush_state cmd;
+} vmentry_l1d_param[] = {
+	{"auto",	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO},
+	{"never",	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER},
+	{"cond",	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND},
+	{"always",	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS},
+};
+
+#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
+static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
+
+static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (!enable_ept) {
+		l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+       if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) {
+	       u64 msr;
+
+	       rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
+	       if (msr & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
+		       l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
+		       return 0;
+	       }
+       }
+
+	/* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */
+	if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
+		switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER;
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
+			break;
+		}
+	} else if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE) {
+		l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
+	}
+
+	if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER && !vmx_l1d_flush_pages &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
+		page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
+		if (!page)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = page_address(page);
+
+		/*
+		 * Initialize each page with a different pattern in
+		 * order to protect against KSM in the nested
+		 * virtualization case.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < 1u << L1D_CACHE_ORDER; ++i) {
+			memset(vmx_l1d_flush_pages + i * PAGE_SIZE, i + 1,
+			       PAGE_SIZE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
+
+	if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+		static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+
+	if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
+		static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(const char *s)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (s) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param); i++) {
+			if (sysfs_streq(s, vmentry_l1d_param[i].option))
+				return vmentry_l1d_param[i].cmd;
+		}
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_set(const char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	int l1tf, ret;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return 0;
+
+	l1tf = vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(s);
+	if (l1tf < 0)
+		return l1tf;
+
+	/*
+	 * Has vmx_init() run already? If not then this is the pre init
+	 * parameter parsing. In that case just store the value and let
+	 * vmx_init() do the proper setup after enable_ept has been
+	 * established.
+	 */
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
+		vmentry_l1d_flush_param = l1tf;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+	ret = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(l1tf);
+	mutex_unlock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	return sprintf(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option);
+}
+
+static const struct kernel_param_ops vmentry_l1d_flush_ops = {
+	.set = vmentry_l1d_flush_set,
+	.get = vmentry_l1d_flush_get,
+};
+module_param_cb(vmentry_l1d_flush, &vmentry_l1d_flush_ops, NULL, 0644);
+
 #define NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS 8
 
 struct vmcs {
@@ -541,6 +685,11 @@ static inline int pi_test_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
 			(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
 }
 
+struct vmx_msrs {
+	unsigned int		nr;
+	struct vmx_msr_entry	val[NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS];
+};
+
 struct vcpu_vmx {
 	struct kvm_vcpu       vcpu;
 	unsigned long         host_rsp;
@@ -573,9 +722,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 	struct loaded_vmcs   *loaded_vmcs;
 	bool                  __launched; /* temporary, used in vmx_vcpu_run */
 	struct msr_autoload {
-		unsigned nr;
-		struct vmx_msr_entry guest[NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS];
-		struct vmx_msr_entry host[NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS];
+		struct vmx_msrs guest;
+		struct vmx_msrs host;
 	} msr_autoload;
 	struct {
 		int           loaded;
@@ -1920,9 +2068,20 @@ static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
 	vm_exit_controls_clearbit(vmx, exit);
 }
 
+static int find_msr(struct vmx_msrs *m, unsigned int msr)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i) {
+		if (m->val[i].index == msr)
+			return i;
+	}
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
 static void clear_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr)
 {
-	unsigned i;
+	int i;
 	struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
 
 	switch (msr) {
@@ -1943,18 +2102,21 @@ static void clear_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr)
 		}
 		break;
 	}
+	i = find_msr(&m->guest, msr);
+	if (i < 0)
+		goto skip_guest;
+	--m->guest.nr;
+	m->guest.val[i] = m->guest.val[m->guest.nr];
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
 
-	for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i)
-		if (m->guest[i].index == msr)
-			break;
-
-	if (i == m->nr)
+skip_guest:
+	i = find_msr(&m->host, msr);
+	if (i < 0)
 		return;
-	--m->nr;
-	m->guest[i] = m->guest[m->nr];
-	m->host[i] = m->host[m->nr];
-	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->nr);
-	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->nr);
+
+	--m->host.nr;
+	m->host.val[i] = m->host.val[m->host.nr];
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
 }
 
 static void add_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
@@ -1969,9 +2131,9 @@ static void add_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
 }
 
 static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
-				  u64 guest_val, u64 host_val)
+				  u64 guest_val, u64 host_val, bool entry_only)
 {
-	unsigned i;
+	int i, j = 0;
 	struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
 
 	switch (msr) {
@@ -2006,24 +2168,31 @@ static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE, 0);
 	}
 
-	for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i)
-		if (m->guest[i].index == msr)
-			break;
+	i = find_msr(&m->guest, msr);
+	if (!entry_only)
+		j = find_msr(&m->host, msr);
 
-	if (i == NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS) {
+	if (i == NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS || j == NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS) {
 		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "Not enough msr switch entries. "
 				"Can't add msr %x\n", msr);
 		return;
-	} else if (i == m->nr) {
-		++m->nr;
-		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->nr);
-		vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->nr);
 	}
+	if (i < 0) {
+		i = m->guest.nr++;
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
+	}
+	m->guest.val[i].index = msr;
+	m->guest.val[i].value = guest_val;
 
-	m->guest[i].index = msr;
-	m->guest[i].value = guest_val;
-	m->host[i].index = msr;
-	m->host[i].value = host_val;
+	if (entry_only)
+		return;
+
+	if (j < 0) {
+		j = m->host.nr++;
+		vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
+	}
+	m->host.val[j].index = msr;
+	m->host.val[j].value = host_val;
 }
 
 static void reload_tss(void)
@@ -2080,7 +2249,7 @@ static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
 			guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME;
 		if (guest_efer != host_efer)
 			add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER,
-					      guest_efer, host_efer);
+					      guest_efer, host_efer, false);
 		return false;
 	} else {
 		guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
@@ -2994,6 +3163,11 @@ static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return !(val & ~valid_bits);
 }
 
+static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * Reads an msr value (of 'msr_index') into 'pdata'.
  * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
@@ -3244,7 +3418,7 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		vcpu->arch.ia32_xss = data;
 		if (vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
 			add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_XSS,
-				vcpu->arch.ia32_xss, host_xss);
+				vcpu->arch.ia32_xss, host_xss, false);
 		else
 			clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_XSS);
 		break;
@@ -5265,9 +5439,9 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 
 	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, 0);
 	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
-	vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host));
+	vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host.val));
 	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
-	vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest));
+	vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val));
 
 	if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
 		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmx->vcpu.arch.pat);
@@ -5287,8 +5461,7 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 		++vmx->nmsrs;
 	}
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
-		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities);
+	vmx->arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
 
 	vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl);
 
@@ -5317,6 +5490,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	u64 cr0;
 
 	vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x100000000ULL;
 	vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
 
 	vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
@@ -5722,6 +5896,7 @@ static int handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		BUG_ON(enable_ept);
 		cr2 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
 		trace_kvm_page_fault(cr2, error_code);
+		vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
 
 		if (kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu))
 			kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(vcpu, cr2);
@@ -8485,6 +8660,79 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Software based L1D cache flush which is used when microcode providing
+ * the cache control MSR is not loaded.
+ *
+ * The L1D cache is 32 KiB on Nehalem and later microarchitectures, but to
+ * flush it is required to read in 64 KiB because the replacement algorithm
+ * is not exactly LRU. This could be sized at runtime via topology
+ * information but as all relevant affected CPUs have 32KiB L1D cache size
+ * there is no point in doing so.
+ */
+#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
+static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
+
+static void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int size = PAGE_SIZE << L1D_CACHE_ORDER;
+
+	/*
+	 * This code is only executed when the the flush mode is 'cond' or
+	 * 'always'
+	 */
+	if (static_branch_likely(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond)) {
+		bool flush_l1d;
+
+		/*
+		 * Clear the per-vcpu flush bit, it gets set again
+		 * either from vcpu_run() or from one of the unsafe
+		 * VMEXIT handlers.
+		 */
+		flush_l1d = vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d;
+		vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = false;
+
+		/*
+		 * Clear the per-cpu flush bit, it gets set again from
+		 * the interrupt handlers.
+		 */
+		flush_l1d |= kvm_get_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
+		kvm_clear_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
+
+		if (!flush_l1d)
+			return;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->stat.l1d_flush++;
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, L1D_FLUSH);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	asm volatile(
+		/* First ensure the pages are in the TLB */
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n"
+		".Lpopulate_tlb:\n\t"
+		"movzbl	(%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
+		"addl	$4096, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cmpl	%%eax, %[size]\n\t"
+		"jne	.Lpopulate_tlb\n\t"
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cpuid\n\t"
+		/* Now fill the cache */
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n"
+		".Lfill_cache:\n"
+		"movzbl	(%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
+		"addl	$64, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cmpl	%%eax, %[size]\n\t"
+		"jne	.Lfill_cache\n\t"
+		"lfence\n"
+		:: [flush_pages] "r" (vmx_l1d_flush_pages),
+		    [size] "r" (size)
+		: "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx");
+}
+
 static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
 {
 	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
@@ -8857,7 +9105,7 @@ static void atomic_switch_perf_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 			clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr);
 		else
 			add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr, msrs[i].guest,
-					msrs[i].host);
+					msrs[i].host, false);
 }
 
 void vmx_arm_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -8941,6 +9189,9 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
 
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
+		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
+
 	asm(
 		/* Store host registers */
 		"push %%" _ASM_DX "; push %%" _ASM_BP ";"
@@ -9298,6 +9549,37 @@ free_vcpu:
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
+#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+
+static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF) && enable_ept) {
+		switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+			/* 'I explicitly don't care' is set */
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+			/*
+			 * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
+			 * insecure environment.
+			 */
+			if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_SMT);
+			if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_L1D);
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+			/* Flush is enforced */
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void __init vmx_check_processor_compat(void *rtn)
 {
 	struct vmcs_config vmcs_conf;
@@ -10092,6 +10374,15 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
 	 */
 	vmx_set_constant_host_state(vmx);
 
+	/*
+	 * Set the MSR load/store lists to match L0's settings.
+	 */
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
+	vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host.val));
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr);
+	vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val));
+
 	/*
 	 * HOST_RSP is normally set correctly in vmx_vcpu_run() just before
 	 * entry, but only if the current (host) sp changed from the value
@@ -10442,6 +10733,9 @@ static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool launch)
 
 	vmcs12->launch_state = 1;
 
+	/* Hide L1D cache contents from the nested guest.  */
+	vmx->vcpu.arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
+
 	if (vmcs12->guest_activity_state == GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT)
 		return kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
 
@@ -10936,6 +11230,8 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason,
 	load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
 
 	/* Update any VMCS fields that might have changed while L2 ran */
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr);
 	vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset);
 	if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc == -1)
 		vmcs_clear_bits(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
@@ -11367,6 +11663,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
 	.cpu_has_accelerated_tpr = report_flexpriority,
 	.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
 
+	.vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
+
 	.vcpu_create = vmx_create_vcpu,
 	.vcpu_free = vmx_free_vcpu,
 	.vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
@@ -11376,6 +11674,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
 	.vcpu_put = vmx_vcpu_put,
 
 	.update_bp_intercept = update_exception_bitmap,
+	.get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
 	.get_msr = vmx_get_msr,
 	.set_msr = vmx_set_msr,
 	.get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
@@ -11486,22 +11785,18 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
 	.setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
 };
 
-static int __init vmx_init(void)
+static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
 {
-	int r = kvm_init(&vmx_x86_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
-                     __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
-	if (r)
-		return r;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
-	rcu_assign_pointer(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss,
-			   crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss);
-#endif
-
-	return 0;
+	if (vmx_l1d_flush_pages) {
+		free_pages((unsigned long)vmx_l1d_flush_pages, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
+		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = NULL;
+	}
+	/* Restore state so sysfs ignores VMX */
+	l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
 }
 
-static void __exit vmx_exit(void)
+
+static void vmx_exit(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
 	RCU_INIT_POINTER(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss, NULL);
@@ -11509,7 +11804,40 @@ static void __exit vmx_exit(void)
 #endif
 
 	kvm_exit();
+
+	vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
 }
+module_exit(vmx_exit)
+
+static int __init vmx_init(void)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = kvm_init(&vmx_x86_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
+		     __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
 
+	/*
+	 * Must be called after kvm_init() so enable_ept is properly set
+	 * up. Hand the parameter mitigation value in which was stored in
+	 * the pre module init parser. If no parameter was given, it will
+	 * contain 'auto' which will be turned into the default 'cond'
+	 * mitigation mode.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
+		r = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(vmentry_l1d_flush_param);
+		if (r) {
+			vmx_exit();
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
+	rcu_assign_pointer(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss,
+			   crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss);
+#endif
+
+	return 0;
+}
 module_init(vmx_init)
-module_exit(vmx_exit)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 5ca23af44c81..203d42340fc1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item debugfs_entries[] = {
 	{ "insn_emulation_fail", VCPU_STAT(insn_emulation_fail) },
 	{ "irq_injections", VCPU_STAT(irq_injections) },
 	{ "nmi_injections", VCPU_STAT(nmi_injections) },
+	{ "l1d_flush", VCPU_STAT(l1d_flush) },
 	{ "mmu_shadow_zapped", VM_STAT(mmu_shadow_zapped) },
 	{ "mmu_pte_write", VM_STAT(mmu_pte_write) },
 	{ "mmu_pte_updated", VM_STAT(mmu_pte_updated) },
@@ -1007,6 +1008,71 @@ static u32 emulated_msrs[] = {
 
 static unsigned num_emulated_msrs;
 
+/*
+ * List of msr numbers which are used to expose MSR-based features that
+ * can be used by a hypervisor to validate requested CPU features.
+ */
+static u32 msr_based_features[] = {
+	MSR_F10H_DECFG,
+	MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV,
+	MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES,
+};
+
+static unsigned int num_msr_based_features;
+
+u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
+{
+	u64 data;
+
+	rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, &data);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're doing cache flushes (either "always" or "cond")
+	 * we will do one whenever the guest does a vmlaunch/vmresume.
+	 * If an outer hypervisor is doing the cache flush for us
+	 * (VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NESTED_VM), we can safely pass that
+	 * capability to the guest too, and if EPT is disabled we're not
+	 * vulnerable.  Overall, only VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER will
+	 * require a nested hypervisor to do a flush of its own.
+	 */
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
+
+	return data;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_arch_capabilities);
+
+static int kvm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
+{
+	switch (msr->index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+		msr->data = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
+		rdmsrl_safe(msr->index, &msr->data);
+		break;
+	default:
+		if (kvm_x86_ops->get_msr_feature(msr))
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_msr_entry msr;
+	int r;
+
+	msr.index = index;
+	r = kvm_get_msr_feature(&msr);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	*data = msr.data;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 bool kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
 {
 	if (efer & efer_reserved_bits)
@@ -2121,13 +2187,16 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 
 	switch (msr) {
 	case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
-	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
 	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE:
 	case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
 	case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER:
 	case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
 		break;
 
+	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
+		if (msr_info->host_initiated)
+			vcpu->arch.microcode_version = data;
+		break;
 	case MSR_EFER:
 		return set_efer(vcpu, data);
 	case MSR_K7_HWCR:
@@ -2402,7 +2471,7 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		msr_info->data = 0;
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
-		msr_info->data = 0x100000000ULL;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.microcode_version;
 		break;
 	case MSR_MTRRcap:
 	case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
@@ -2545,13 +2614,11 @@ static int __msr_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_msrs *msrs,
 		    int (*do_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				  unsigned index, u64 *data))
 {
-	int i, idx;
+	int i;
 
-	idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
 	for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i)
 		if (do_msr(vcpu, entries[i].index, &entries[i].data))
 			break;
-	srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
 
 	return i;
 }
@@ -2651,6 +2718,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 	case KVM_CAP_ASSIGN_DEV_IRQ:
 	case KVM_CAP_PCI_2_3:
 #endif
+	case KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES:
 		r = 1;
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_ADJUST_CLOCK:
@@ -2770,6 +2838,31 @@ long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 			goto out;
 		r = 0;
 		break;
+	case KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST: {
+		struct kvm_msr_list __user *user_msr_list = argp;
+		struct kvm_msr_list msr_list;
+		unsigned int n;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&msr_list, user_msr_list, sizeof(msr_list)))
+			goto out;
+		n = msr_list.nmsrs;
+		msr_list.nmsrs = num_msr_based_features;
+		if (copy_to_user(user_msr_list, &msr_list, sizeof(msr_list)))
+			goto out;
+		r = -E2BIG;
+		if (n < msr_list.nmsrs)
+			goto out;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(user_msr_list->indices, &msr_based_features,
+				 num_msr_based_features * sizeof(u32)))
+			goto out;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_MSRS:
+		r = msr_io(NULL, argp, do_get_msr_feature, 1);
+		break;
 	}
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
@@ -3451,12 +3544,18 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		r = 0;
 		break;
 	}
-	case KVM_GET_MSRS:
+	case KVM_GET_MSRS: {
+		int idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
 		r = msr_io(vcpu, argp, do_get_msr, 1);
+		srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
 		break;
-	case KVM_SET_MSRS:
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_MSRS: {
+		int idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
 		r = msr_io(vcpu, argp, do_set_msr, 0);
+		srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
 		break;
+	}
 	case KVM_TPR_ACCESS_REPORTING: {
 		struct kvm_tpr_access_ctl tac;
 
@@ -4236,6 +4335,19 @@ static void kvm_init_msr_list(void)
 		j++;
 	}
 	num_emulated_msrs = j;
+
+	for (i = j = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features); i++) {
+		struct kvm_msr_entry msr;
+
+		msr.index = msr_based_features[i];
+		if (kvm_get_msr_feature(&msr))
+			continue;
+
+		if (j < i)
+			msr_based_features[j] = msr_based_features[i];
+		j++;
+	}
+	num_msr_based_features = j;
 }
 
 static int vcpu_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, int len,
@@ -4476,6 +4588,9 @@ static int emulator_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gva_t addr, void *v
 int kvm_write_guest_virt_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, void *val,
 				unsigned int bytes, struct x86_exception *exception)
 {
+	/* kvm_write_guest_virt_system can pull in tons of pages. */
+	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
+
 	return kvm_write_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu,
 					   PFERR_WRITE_MASK, exception);
 }
@@ -5574,6 +5689,8 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	bool writeback = true;
 	bool write_fault_to_spt = vcpu->arch.write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable;
 
+	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
+
 	/*
 	 * Clear write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable here to ensure it is
 	 * never reused.
@@ -6929,6 +7046,7 @@ static int vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
 
 	vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
 
 	for (;;) {
 		if (kvm_vcpu_running(vcpu)) {
@@ -7899,6 +8017,7 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 void kvm_arch_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 {
+	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
 	kvm_x86_ops->sched_in(vcpu, cpu);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index ae23c996e3a8..acef3c6a32a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <asm/vsyscall.h>		/* emulate_vsyscall		*/
 #include <asm/vm86.h>			/* struct vm86			*/
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>		/* vma_pkey()			*/
+#include <asm/sections.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <asm/trace/exceptions.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
index ae9b84cae57c..5d35b555115a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/bootmem.h>	/* for max_low_pfn */
+#include <linux/swapfile.h>
+#include <linux/swapops.h>
 
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/e820.h>
@@ -780,3 +782,26 @@ void update_cache_mode_entry(unsigned entry, enum page_cache_mode cache)
 	__cachemode2pte_tbl[cache] = __cm_idx2pte(entry);
 	__pte2cachemode_tbl[entry] = cache;
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
+unsigned long max_swapfile_size(void)
+{
+	unsigned long pages;
+
+	pages = generic_max_swapfile_size();
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
+		/* Limit the swap file size to MAX_PA/2 for L1TF workaround */
+		unsigned long l1tf_limit = l1tf_pfn_limit() + 1;
+		/*
+		 * We encode swap offsets also with 3 bits below those for pfn
+		 * which makes the usable limit higher.
+		 */
+#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2
+		l1tf_limit <<= PAGE_SHIFT - SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT;
+#endif
+		pages = min_t(unsigned long, l1tf_limit, pages);
+	}
+	return pages;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c b/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
index ec678aafa3f8..3f729e20f0e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
 #include <asm/vsyscall.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
 
 int kaiser_enabled __read_mostly = 1;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kaiser_enabled);	/* for inlined TLB flush functions */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kmmio.c b/arch/x86/mm/kmmio.c
index cadb82be5f36..c695272d89be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kmmio.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kmmio.c
@@ -125,24 +125,29 @@ static struct kmmio_fault_page *get_kmmio_fault_page(unsigned long addr)
 
 static void clear_pmd_presence(pmd_t *pmd, bool clear, pmdval_t *old)
 {
+	pmd_t new_pmd;
 	pmdval_t v = pmd_val(*pmd);
 	if (clear) {
-		*old = v & _PAGE_PRESENT;
-		v &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
-	} else	/* presume this has been called with clear==true previously */
-		v |= *old;
-	set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(v));
+		*old = v;
+		new_pmd = pmd_mknotpresent(*pmd);
+	} else {
+		/* Presume this has been called with clear==true previously */
+		new_pmd = __pmd(*old);
+	}
+	set_pmd(pmd, new_pmd);
 }
 
 static void clear_pte_presence(pte_t *pte, bool clear, pteval_t *old)
 {
 	pteval_t v = pte_val(*pte);
 	if (clear) {
-		*old = v & _PAGE_PRESENT;
-		v &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
-	} else	/* presume this has been called with clear==true previously */
-		v |= *old;
-	set_pte_atomic(pte, __pte(v));
+		*old = v;
+		/* Nothing should care about address */
+		pte_clear(&init_mm, 0, pte);
+	} else {
+		/* Presume this has been called with clear==true previously */
+		set_pte_atomic(pte, __pte(*old));
+	}
 }
 
 static int clear_page_presence(struct kmmio_fault_page *f, bool clear)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index d2dc0438d654..5aad869fa205 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -121,3 +121,24 @@ const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 		return "[mpx]";
 	return NULL;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Only allow root to set high MMIO mappings to PROT_NONE.
+ * This prevents an unpriv. user to set them to PROT_NONE and invert
+ * them, then pointing to valid memory for L1TF speculation.
+ *
+ * Note: for locked down kernels may want to disable the root override.
+ */
+bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return true;
+	if (!__pte_needs_invert(pgprot_val(prot)))
+		return true;
+	/* If it's real memory always allow */
+	if (pfn_valid(pfn))
+		return true;
+	if (pfn > l1tf_pfn_limit() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
index dcd671467154..1271bc9fa3c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -1001,8 +1001,8 @@ static long populate_pmd(struct cpa_data *cpa,
 
 		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, start);
 
-		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(cpa->pfn << PAGE_SHIFT | _PAGE_PSE |
-				   massage_pgprot(pmd_pgprot)));
+		set_pmd(pmd, pmd_mkhuge(pfn_pmd(cpa->pfn,
+					canon_pgprot(pmd_pgprot))));
 
 		start	  += PMD_SIZE;
 		cpa->pfn  += PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -1074,8 +1074,8 @@ static long populate_pud(struct cpa_data *cpa, unsigned long start, pgd_t *pgd,
 	 * Map everything starting from the Gb boundary, possibly with 1G pages
 	 */
 	while (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) && end - start >= PUD_SIZE) {
-		set_pud(pud, __pud(cpa->pfn << PAGE_SHIFT | _PAGE_PSE |
-				   massage_pgprot(pud_pgprot)));
+		set_pud(pud, pud_mkhuge(pfn_pud(cpa->pfn,
+				   canon_pgprot(pud_pgprot))));
 
 		start	  += PUD_SIZE;
 		cpa->pfn  += PUD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT;
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index dcb2d9d185a2..351a55dc4a1d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #include <asm/realmode.h>
 #include <asm/time.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
 
 /*
  * We allocate runtime services regions bottom-up, starting from -4G, i.e.
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
index 393a0c0288d1..dee99391d7b2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/dmi.h>
 #include <asm/efi.h>
 #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
 
 #define EFI_MIN_RESERVE 5120
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/intel-mid/device_libs/platform_mrfld_wdt.c b/arch/x86/platform/intel-mid/device_libs/platform_mrfld_wdt.c
index 10bad1e55fcc..85e112ea7aff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/intel-mid/device_libs/platform_mrfld_wdt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/intel-mid/device_libs/platform_mrfld_wdt.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <asm/intel-mid.h>
 #include <asm/intel_scu_ipc.h>
 #include <asm/io_apic.h>
+#include <asm/hw_irq.h>
 
 #define TANGIER_EXT_TIMER0_MSI 12
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/uv/tlb_uv.c b/arch/x86/platform/uv/tlb_uv.c
index 0f0175186f1b..16d4967d59ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/uv/tlb_uv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/uv/tlb_uv.c
@@ -1283,6 +1283,7 @@ void uv_bau_message_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	struct msg_desc msgdesc;
 
 	ack_APIC_irq();
+	kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
 	time_start = get_cycles();
 
 	bcp = &per_cpu(bau_control, smp_processor_id());
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
index 2986a13b9786..db7cf8727e1c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/frame.h>
 
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 
 #include <xen/xen.h>
 #include <xen/events.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c
index 9f21b0c5945d..36bfafb2a853 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/acpi.h>
 #include <asm/numa.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
 #include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
 #include <asm/xen/hypercall.h>
 
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpi_lpss.c b/drivers/acpi/acpi_lpss.c
index 373657f7e35a..3cdd2c3a5bfc 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/acpi_lpss.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/acpi_lpss.c
@@ -187,10 +187,12 @@ static const struct lpss_device_desc lpt_sdio_dev_desc = {
 
 static const struct lpss_device_desc byt_pwm_dev_desc = {
 	.flags = LPSS_SAVE_CTX,
+	.prv_offset = 0x800,
 };
 
 static const struct lpss_device_desc bsw_pwm_dev_desc = {
 	.flags = LPSS_SAVE_CTX | LPSS_NO_D3_DELAY,
+	.prv_offset = 0x800,
 };
 
 static const struct lpss_device_desc byt_uart_dev_desc = {
diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index cbb1cc6bbdb4..f1f4ce7ddb47 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -525,16 +525,24 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
+			     struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spectre_v1.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
+	&dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
index 65b824954bdc..1662e4688ee2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ struct file_priv {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip;
 
 	/* Data passed to and from the tpm via the read/write calls */
-	atomic_t data_pending;
+	size_t data_pending;
 	struct mutex buffer_mutex;
 
 	struct timer_list user_read_timer;      /* user needs to claim result */
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static void timeout_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct file_priv *priv = container_of(work, struct file_priv, work);
 
 	mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
-	atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+	priv->data_pending = 0;
 	memset(priv->data_buffer, 0, sizeof(priv->data_buffer));
 	mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
 }
@@ -72,7 +72,6 @@ static int tpm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	}
 
 	priv->chip = chip;
-	atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
 	mutex_init(&priv->buffer_mutex);
 	setup_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, user_reader_timeout,
 			(unsigned long)priv);
@@ -86,28 +85,24 @@ static ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 			size_t size, loff_t *off)
 {
 	struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
-	ssize_t ret_size;
+	ssize_t ret_size = 0;
 	int rc;
 
 	del_singleshot_timer_sync(&priv->user_read_timer);
 	flush_work(&priv->work);
-	ret_size = atomic_read(&priv->data_pending);
-	if (ret_size > 0) {	/* relay data */
-		ssize_t orig_ret_size = ret_size;
-		if (size < ret_size)
-			ret_size = size;
+	mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
 
-		mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+	if (priv->data_pending) {
+		ret_size = min_t(ssize_t, size, priv->data_pending);
 		rc = copy_to_user(buf, priv->data_buffer, ret_size);
-		memset(priv->data_buffer, 0, orig_ret_size);
+		memset(priv->data_buffer, 0, priv->data_pending);
 		if (rc)
 			ret_size = -EFAULT;
 
-		mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+		priv->data_pending = 0;
 	}
 
-	atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
-
+	mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
 	return ret_size;
 }
 
@@ -118,18 +113,20 @@ static ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	size_t in_size = size;
 	ssize_t out_size;
 
-	/* cannot perform a write until the read has cleared
-	   either via tpm_read or a user_read_timer timeout.
-	   This also prevents splitted buffered writes from blocking here.
-	*/
-	if (atomic_read(&priv->data_pending) != 0)
-		return -EBUSY;
-
 	if (in_size > TPM_BUFSIZE)
 		return -E2BIG;
 
 	mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
 
+	/* Cannot perform a write until the read has cleared either via
+	 * tpm_read or a user_read_timer timeout. This also prevents split
+	 * buffered writes from blocking here.
+	 */
+	if (priv->data_pending != 0) {
+		mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
 	if (copy_from_user
 	    (priv->data_buffer, (void __user *) buf, in_size)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
@@ -159,7 +156,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return out_size;
 	}
 
-	atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, out_size);
+	priv->data_pending = out_size;
 	mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
 
 	/* Set a timeout by which the reader must come claim the result */
@@ -178,7 +175,7 @@ static int tpm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	del_singleshot_timer_sync(&priv->user_read_timer);
 	flush_work(&priv->work);
 	file->private_data = NULL;
-	atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+	priv->data_pending = 0;
 	clear_bit(0, &priv->chip->is_open);
 	kfree(priv);
 	return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c
index e74aa1d60fdb..99cebf3a9163 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c
@@ -122,16 +122,7 @@ struct ib_umem *ib_umem_get(struct ib_ucontext *context, unsigned long addr,
 	umem->address   = addr;
 	umem->page_size = PAGE_SIZE;
 	umem->pid       = get_task_pid(current, PIDTYPE_PID);
-	/*
-	 * We ask for writable memory if any of the following
-	 * access flags are set.  "Local write" and "remote write"
-	 * obviously require write access.  "Remote atomic" can do
-	 * things like fetch and add, which will modify memory, and
-	 * "MW bind" can change permissions by binding a window.
-	 */
-	umem->writable  = !!(access &
-		(IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE   | IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_WRITE |
-		 IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_ATOMIC | IB_ACCESS_MW_BIND));
+	umem->writable   = ib_access_writable(access);
 
 	if (access & IB_ACCESS_ON_DEMAND) {
 		put_pid(umem->pid);
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c
index ae41623e0f13..0d4878efd643 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c
@@ -131,6 +131,40 @@ out:
 	return err;
 }
 
+static struct ib_umem *mlx4_get_umem_mr(struct ib_ucontext *context, u64 start,
+					u64 length, u64 virt_addr,
+					int access_flags)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Force registering the memory as writable if the underlying pages
+	 * are writable.  This is so rereg can change the access permissions
+	 * from readable to writable without having to run through ib_umem_get
+	 * again
+	 */
+	if (!ib_access_writable(access_flags)) {
+		struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+		down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+		/*
+		 * FIXME: Ideally this would iterate over all the vmas that
+		 * cover the memory, but for now it requires a single vma to
+		 * entirely cover the MR to support RO mappings.
+		 */
+		vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
+		if (vma && vma->vm_end >= start + length &&
+		    vma->vm_start <= start) {
+			if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+				access_flags |= IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE;
+		} else {
+			access_flags |= IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE;
+		}
+
+		up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+	}
+
+	return ib_umem_get(context, start, length, access_flags, 0);
+}
+
 struct ib_mr *mlx4_ib_reg_user_mr(struct ib_pd *pd, u64 start, u64 length,
 				  u64 virt_addr, int access_flags,
 				  struct ib_udata *udata)
@@ -145,10 +179,8 @@ struct ib_mr *mlx4_ib_reg_user_mr(struct ib_pd *pd, u64 start, u64 length,
 	if (!mr)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
-	/* Force registering the memory as writable. */
-	/* Used for memory re-registeration. HCA protects the access */
-	mr->umem = ib_umem_get(pd->uobject->context, start, length,
-			       access_flags | IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE, 0);
+	mr->umem = mlx4_get_umem_mr(pd->uobject->context, start, length,
+				    virt_addr, access_flags);
 	if (IS_ERR(mr->umem)) {
 		err = PTR_ERR(mr->umem);
 		goto err_free;
@@ -215,6 +247,9 @@ int mlx4_ib_rereg_user_mr(struct ib_mr *mr, int flags,
 	}
 
 	if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) {
+		if (ib_access_writable(mr_access_flags) && !mmr->umem->writable)
+			return -EPERM;
+
 		err = mlx4_mr_hw_change_access(dev->dev, *pmpt_entry,
 					       convert_access(mr_access_flags));
 
@@ -228,10 +263,9 @@ int mlx4_ib_rereg_user_mr(struct ib_mr *mr, int flags,
 
 		mlx4_mr_rereg_mem_cleanup(dev->dev, &mmr->mmr);
 		ib_umem_release(mmr->umem);
-		mmr->umem = ib_umem_get(mr->uobject->context, start, length,
-					mr_access_flags |
-					IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE,
-					0);
+		mmr->umem =
+			mlx4_get_umem_mr(mr->uobject->context, start, length,
+					 virt_addr, mr_access_flags);
 		if (IS_ERR(mmr->umem)) {
 			err = PTR_ERR(mmr->umem);
 			/* Prevent mlx4_ib_dereg_mr from free'ing invalid pointer */
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_stats.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_stats.c
index 265943069b35..84349d976162 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_stats.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_stats.c
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ static ssize_t ocrdma_dbgfs_ops_write(struct file *filp,
 	struct ocrdma_stats *pstats = filp->private_data;
 	struct ocrdma_dev *dev = pstats->dev;
 
-	if (count > 32)
+	if (*ppos != 0 || count == 0 || count > sizeof(tmp_str))
 		goto err;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(tmp_str, buffer, count))
diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/qcom_nandc.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/qcom_nandc.c
index 6f0fd1512ad2..dc4943134649 100644
--- a/drivers/mtd/nand/qcom_nandc.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/qcom_nandc.c
@@ -2008,6 +2008,9 @@ static int qcom_nand_host_init(struct qcom_nand_controller *nandc,
 
 	nand_set_flash_node(chip, dn);
 	mtd->name = devm_kasprintf(dev, GFP_KERNEL, "qcom_nand.%d", host->cs);
+	if (!mtd->name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	mtd->owner = THIS_MODULE;
 	mtd->dev.parent = dev;
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
index 681256f97cb3..cd2c6ffdbdde 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -893,7 +893,6 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 				  struct sk_buff *skb,
 				  struct sk_buff_head *list)
 {
-	struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
 	RING_IDX cons = queue->rx.rsp_cons;
 	struct sk_buff *nskb;
 
@@ -902,15 +901,16 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 			RING_GET_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, ++cons);
 		skb_frag_t *nfrag = &skb_shinfo(nskb)->frags[0];
 
-		if (shinfo->nr_frags == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
+		if (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
 			unsigned int pull_to = NETFRONT_SKB_CB(skb)->pull_to;
 
 			BUG_ON(pull_to <= skb_headlen(skb));
 			__pskb_pull_tail(skb, pull_to - skb_headlen(skb));
 		}
-		BUG_ON(shinfo->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
+		BUG_ON(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
 
-		skb_add_rx_frag(skb, shinfo->nr_frags, skb_frag_page(nfrag),
+		skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags,
+				skb_frag_page(nfrag),
 				rx->offset, rx->status, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 		skb_shinfo(nskb)->nr_frags = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c b/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
index d392a55ec0a9..b4d8ccfd9f7c 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/semaphore.h>
 #include <linux/irqdomain.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
+
 #include <asm/irqdomain.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <linux/msi.h>
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sr.c b/drivers/scsi/sr.c
index 01699845c42c..cc484cb287d2 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/sr.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sr.c
@@ -520,18 +520,26 @@ static int sr_init_command(struct scsi_cmnd *SCpnt)
 static int sr_block_open(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode)
 {
 	struct scsi_cd *cd;
+	struct scsi_device *sdev;
 	int ret = -ENXIO;
 
+	cd = scsi_cd_get(bdev->bd_disk);
+	if (!cd)
+		goto out;
+
+	sdev = cd->device;
+	scsi_autopm_get_device(sdev);
 	check_disk_change(bdev);
 
 	mutex_lock(&sr_mutex);
-	cd = scsi_cd_get(bdev->bd_disk);
-	if (cd) {
-		ret = cdrom_open(&cd->cdi, bdev, mode);
-		if (ret)
-			scsi_cd_put(cd);
-	}
+	ret = cdrom_open(&cd->cdi, bdev, mode);
 	mutex_unlock(&sr_mutex);
+
+	scsi_autopm_put_device(sdev);
+	if (ret)
+		scsi_cd_put(cd);
+
+out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -559,6 +567,8 @@ static int sr_block_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode, unsigned cmd,
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
+	scsi_autopm_get_device(sdev);
+
 	/*
 	 * Send SCSI addressing ioctls directly to mid level, send other
 	 * ioctls to cdrom/block level.
@@ -567,15 +577,18 @@ static int sr_block_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode, unsigned cmd,
 	case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_IDLUN:
 	case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_BUS_NUMBER:
 		ret = scsi_ioctl(sdev, cmd, argp);
-		goto out;
+		goto put;
 	}
 
 	ret = cdrom_ioctl(&cd->cdi, bdev, mode, cmd, arg);
 	if (ret != -ENOSYS)
-		goto out;
+		goto put;
 
 	ret = scsi_ioctl(sdev, cmd, argp);
 
+put:
+	scsi_autopm_put_device(sdev);
+
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&sr_mutex);
 	return ret;
diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
index 7a5e6f9717f5..461ff8f234e3 100644
--- a/fs/dcache.c
+++ b/fs/dcache.c
@@ -352,14 +352,11 @@ static void dentry_unlink_inode(struct dentry * dentry)
 	__releases(dentry->d_inode->i_lock)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	bool hashed = !d_unhashed(dentry);
 
-	if (hashed)
-		raw_write_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
+	raw_write_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
 	__d_clear_type_and_inode(dentry);
 	hlist_del_init(&dentry->d_u.d_alias);
-	if (hashed)
-		raw_write_seqcount_end(&dentry->d_seq);
+	raw_write_seqcount_end(&dentry->d_seq);
 	spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
 	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 	if (!inode->i_nlink)
@@ -1914,10 +1911,12 @@ struct dentry *d_make_root(struct inode *root_inode)
 
 	if (root_inode) {
 		res = __d_alloc(root_inode->i_sb, NULL);
-		if (res)
+		if (res) {
+			res->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
 			d_instantiate(res, root_inode);
-		else
+		} else {
 			iput(root_inode);
+		}
 	}
 	return res;
 }
diff --git a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
index ffaf66a51de3..4f78e099de1d 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
@@ -1316,7 +1316,10 @@ int ext4_init_inode_table(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t group,
 			    ext4_itable_unused_count(sb, gdp)),
 			    sbi->s_inodes_per_block);
 
-	if ((used_blks < 0) || (used_blks > sbi->s_itb_per_group)) {
+	if ((used_blks < 0) || (used_blks > sbi->s_itb_per_group) ||
+	    ((group == 0) && ((EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) -
+			       ext4_itable_unused_count(sb, gdp)) <
+			      EXT4_FIRST_INO(sb)))) {
 		ext4_error(sb, "Something is wrong with group %u: "
 			   "used itable blocks: %d; "
 			   "itable unused count: %u",
diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
index 6cbb0f7ead2f..9d44b3683b46 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -3031,14 +3031,8 @@ static ext4_group_t ext4_has_uninit_itable(struct super_block *sb)
 		if (!gdp)
 			continue;
 
-		if (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED))
-			continue;
-		if (group != 0)
+		if (!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)))
 			break;
-		ext4_error(sb, "Inode table for bg 0 marked as "
-			   "needing zeroing");
-		if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
-			return ngroups;
 	}
 
 	return group;
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 6c873b330a93..0a9e766b4087 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -603,12 +603,21 @@ int __legitimize_mnt(struct vfsmount *bastard, unsigned seq)
 		return 0;
 	mnt = real_mount(bastard);
 	mnt_add_count(mnt, 1);
+	smp_mb();			// see mntput_no_expire()
 	if (likely(!read_seqretry(&mount_lock, seq)))
 		return 0;
 	if (bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT) {
 		mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
 		return 1;
 	}
+	lock_mount_hash();
+	if (unlikely(bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_DOOMED)) {
+		mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
+		unlock_mount_hash();
+		return 1;
+	}
+	unlock_mount_hash();
+	/* caller will mntput() */
 	return -1;
 }
 
@@ -1139,12 +1148,27 @@ static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(delayed_mntput_work, delayed_mntput);
 static void mntput_no_expire(struct mount *mnt)
 {
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
-	if (likely(mnt->mnt_ns)) { /* shouldn't be the last one */
+	if (likely(READ_ONCE(mnt->mnt_ns))) {
+		/*
+		 * Since we don't do lock_mount_hash() here,
+		 * ->mnt_ns can change under us.  However, if it's
+		 * non-NULL, then there's a reference that won't
+		 * be dropped until after an RCU delay done after
+		 * turning ->mnt_ns NULL.  So if we observe it
+		 * non-NULL under rcu_read_lock(), the reference
+		 * we are dropping is not the final one.
+		 */
+		mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return;
 	}
 	lock_mount_hash();
+	/*
+	 * make sure that if __legitimize_mnt() has not seen us grab
+	 * mount_lock, we'll see their refcount increment here.
+	 */
+	smp_mb();
+	mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
 	if (mnt_get_count(mnt)) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		unlock_mount_hash();
diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
index e69ebe648a34..c2afe39f0b9e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/inode.c
+++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
@@ -43,10 +43,11 @@ static void proc_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	de = PDE(inode);
 	if (de)
 		pde_put(de);
+
 	head = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl;
 	if (head) {
 		RCU_INIT_POINTER(PROC_I(inode)->sysctl, NULL);
-		sysctl_head_put(head);
+		proc_sys_evict_inode(inode, head);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 5378441ec1b7..c0bdeceaaeb6 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct proc_inode {
 	struct proc_dir_entry *pde;
 	struct ctl_table_header *sysctl;
 	struct ctl_table *sysctl_entry;
+	struct hlist_node sysctl_inodes;
 	const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops;
 	struct inode vfs_inode;
 };
@@ -249,10 +250,12 @@ extern void proc_thread_self_init(void);
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
 extern int proc_sys_init(void);
-extern void sysctl_head_put(struct ctl_table_header *);
+extern void proc_sys_evict_inode(struct inode *inode,
+				 struct ctl_table_header *head);
 #else
 static inline void proc_sys_init(void) { }
-static inline void sysctl_head_put(struct ctl_table_header *head) { }
+static inline void proc_sys_evict_inode(struct  inode *inode,
+					struct ctl_table_header *head) { }
 #endif
 
 /*
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index 847f23420b40..46cd2e1b055b 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static void init_header(struct ctl_table_header *head,
 	head->set = set;
 	head->parent = NULL;
 	head->node = node;
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&head->inodes);
 	if (node) {
 		struct ctl_table *entry;
 		for (entry = table; entry->procname; entry++, node++)
@@ -259,6 +260,44 @@ static void unuse_table(struct ctl_table_header *p)
 			complete(p->unregistering);
 }
 
+static void proc_sys_prune_dcache(struct ctl_table_header *head)
+{
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct proc_inode *ei;
+	struct hlist_node *node;
+	struct super_block *sb;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	for (;;) {
+		node = hlist_first_rcu(&head->inodes);
+		if (!node)
+			break;
+		ei = hlist_entry(node, struct proc_inode, sysctl_inodes);
+		spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
+		hlist_del_init_rcu(&ei->sysctl_inodes);
+		spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
+
+		inode = &ei->vfs_inode;
+		sb = inode->i_sb;
+		if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&sb->s_active))
+			continue;
+		inode = igrab(inode);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		if (unlikely(!inode)) {
+			deactivate_super(sb);
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		d_prune_aliases(inode);
+		iput(inode);
+		deactivate_super(sb);
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
 /* called under sysctl_lock, will reacquire if has to wait */
 static void start_unregistering(struct ctl_table_header *p)
 {
@@ -272,31 +311,22 @@ static void start_unregistering(struct ctl_table_header *p)
 		p->unregistering = &wait;
 		spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
 		wait_for_completion(&wait);
-		spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
 	} else {
 		/* anything non-NULL; we'll never dereference it */
 		p->unregistering = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
 	}
+	/*
+	 * Prune dentries for unregistered sysctls: namespaced sysctls
+	 * can have duplicate names and contaminate dcache very badly.
+	 */
+	proc_sys_prune_dcache(p);
 	/*
 	 * do not remove from the list until nobody holds it; walking the
 	 * list in do_sysctl() relies on that.
 	 */
-	erase_header(p);
-}
-
-static void sysctl_head_get(struct ctl_table_header *head)
-{
 	spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
-	head->count++;
-	spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
-}
-
-void sysctl_head_put(struct ctl_table_header *head)
-{
-	spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
-	if (!--head->count)
-		kfree_rcu(head, rcu);
-	spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
+	erase_header(p);
 }
 
 static struct ctl_table_header *sysctl_head_grab(struct ctl_table_header *head)
@@ -440,10 +470,20 @@ static struct inode *proc_sys_make_inode(struct super_block *sb,
 
 	inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
 
-	sysctl_head_get(head);
 	ei = PROC_I(inode);
+
+	spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
+	if (unlikely(head->unregistering)) {
+		spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
+		iput(inode);
+		inode = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	ei->sysctl = head;
 	ei->sysctl_entry = table;
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&ei->sysctl_inodes, &head->inodes);
+	head->count++;
+	spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
 
 	inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
 	inode->i_mode = table->mode;
@@ -466,6 +506,15 @@ out:
 	return inode;
 }
 
+void proc_sys_evict_inode(struct inode *inode, struct ctl_table_header *head)
+{
+	spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
+	hlist_del_init_rcu(&PROC_I(inode)->sysctl_inodes);
+	if (!--head->count)
+		kfree_rcu(head, rcu);
+	spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
+}
+
 static struct ctl_table_header *grab_header(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct ctl_table_header *head = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl;
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index 4e8551c8ef18..a88ea9e37a25 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -828,6 +828,19 @@ static inline int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd)
 struct file;
 int phys_mem_access_prot_allowed(struct file *file, unsigned long pfn,
 			unsigned long size, pgprot_t *vma_prot);
+
+#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED
+static inline bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif /* !_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED */
+
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #ifndef io_remap_pfn_range
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
index 01225b0059b1..21c88a7ac23b 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
  */
 #define __UNIQUE_ID(prefix) __PASTE(__PASTE(__UNIQUE_ID_, prefix), __COUNTER__)
 
+#undef __no_sanitize_address
+#define __no_sanitize_address __attribute__((no_sanitize("address")))
+
 /* Clang doesn't have a way to turn it off per-function, yet. */
 #ifdef __noretpoline
 #undef __noretpoline
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index 917829b27350..ae5ac89324df 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct cpu {
 };
 
 extern void boot_cpu_init(void);
-extern void boot_cpu_state_init(void);
+extern void boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void);
 
 extern int register_cpu(struct cpu *cpu, int num);
 extern struct device *get_cpu_device(unsigned cpu);
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
 				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
 					  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
+			     struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
@@ -255,4 +257,23 @@ void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void);
 static inline void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void) { }
 #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
 
+enum cpuhp_smt_control {
+	CPU_SMT_ENABLED,
+	CPU_SMT_DISABLED,
+	CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED,
+	CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+};
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT)
+extern enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control;
+extern void cpu_smt_disable(bool force);
+extern void cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void);
+extern void cpu_smt_check_topology(void);
+#else
+# define cpu_smt_control		(CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
+static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void) { }
+static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
diff --git a/include/linux/swapfile.h b/include/linux/swapfile.h
index 388293a91e8c..e4594de79bc4 100644
--- a/include/linux/swapfile.h
+++ b/include/linux/swapfile.h
@@ -9,5 +9,7 @@ extern spinlock_t swap_lock;
 extern struct plist_head swap_active_head;
 extern struct swap_info_struct *swap_info[];
 extern int try_to_unuse(unsigned int, bool, unsigned long);
+extern unsigned long generic_max_swapfile_size(void);
+extern unsigned long max_swapfile_size(void);
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_SWAPFILE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
index adf4e51cf597..0e5cc33b9b25 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct ctl_table_header
 	struct ctl_table_set *set;
 	struct ctl_dir *parent;
 	struct ctl_node *node;
+	struct hlist_head inodes; /* head for proc_inode->sysctl_inodes */
 };
 
 struct ctl_dir {
diff --git a/include/rdma/ib_verbs.h b/include/rdma/ib_verbs.h
index 5ad43a487745..a42535f252b5 100644
--- a/include/rdma/ib_verbs.h
+++ b/include/rdma/ib_verbs.h
@@ -3308,6 +3308,20 @@ static inline int ib_check_mr_access(int flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline bool ib_access_writable(int access_flags)
+{
+	/*
+	 * We have writable memory backing the MR if any of the following
+	 * access flags are set.  "Local write" and "remote write" obviously
+	 * require write access.  "Remote atomic" can do things like fetch and
+	 * add, which will modify memory, and "MW bind" can change permissions
+	 * by binding a window.
+	 */
+	return access_flags &
+		(IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE   | IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_WRITE |
+		 IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_ATOMIC | IB_ACCESS_MW_BIND);
+}
+
 /**
  * ib_check_mr_status: lightweight check of MR status.
  *     This routine may provide status checks on a selected
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 05b9bb63dbec..a0a365cbf3c9 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -717,6 +717,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_smmu_info {
 #define KVM_TRACE_PAUSE           __KVM_DEPRECATED_MAIN_0x07
 #define KVM_TRACE_DISABLE         __KVM_DEPRECATED_MAIN_0x08
 #define KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID	  _IOWR(KVMIO, 0x09, struct kvm_cpuid2)
+#define KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST    _IOWR(KVMIO, 0x0a, struct kvm_msr_list)
 
 /*
  * Extension capability list.
@@ -871,6 +872,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_smmu_info {
 #define KVM_CAP_MSI_DEVID 131
 #define KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM 132
 #define KVM_CAP_S390_BPB 152
+#define KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES 153
 
 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
 
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index f22957afb37e..4313772d634a 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -509,8 +509,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
 	setup_command_line(command_line);
 	setup_nr_cpu_ids();
 	setup_per_cpu_areas();
-	boot_cpu_state_init();
 	smp_prepare_boot_cpu();	/* arch-specific boot-cpu hooks */
+	boot_cpu_hotplug_init();
 
 	build_all_zonelists(NULL, NULL);
 	page_alloc_init();
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index 967163fb90a8..b5a0165b7300 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ struct cpuhp_cpu_state {
 	bool			rollback;
 	bool			single;
 	bool			bringup;
+	bool			booted_once;
 	struct hlist_node	*node;
 	enum cpuhp_state	cb_state;
 	int			result;
@@ -355,6 +356,85 @@ void cpu_hotplug_enable(void)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_hotplug_enable);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
+enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_control);
+
+static bool cpu_smt_available __read_mostly;
+
+void __init cpu_smt_disable(bool force)
+{
+	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED ||
+		cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+		return;
+
+	if (force) {
+		pr_info("SMT: Force disabled\n");
+		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED;
+	} else {
+		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_DISABLED;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * The decision whether SMT is supported can only be done after the full
+ * CPU identification. Called from architecture code before non boot CPUs
+ * are brought up.
+ */
+void __init cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void)
+{
+	if (!topology_smt_supported())
+		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If SMT was disabled by BIOS, detect it here, after the CPUs have been
+ * brought online. This ensures the smt/l1tf sysfs entries are consistent
+ * with reality. cpu_smt_available is set to true during the bringup of non
+ * boot CPUs when a SMT sibling is detected. Note, this may overwrite
+ * cpu_smt_control's previous setting.
+ */
+void __init cpu_smt_check_topology(void)
+{
+	if (!cpu_smt_available)
+		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+static int __init smt_cmdline_disable(char *str)
+{
+	cpu_smt_disable(str && !strcmp(str, "force"));
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nosmt", smt_cmdline_disable);
+
+static inline bool cpu_smt_allowed(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	if (topology_is_primary_thread(cpu))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the CPU is not a 'primary' thread and the booted_once bit is
+	 * set then the processor has SMT support. Store this information
+	 * for the late check of SMT support in cpu_smt_check_topology().
+	 */
+	if (per_cpu(cpuhp_state, cpu).booted_once)
+		cpu_smt_available = true;
+
+	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * On x86 it's required to boot all logical CPUs at least once so
+	 * that the init code can get a chance to set CR4.MCE on each
+	 * CPU. Otherwise, a broadacasted MCE observing CR4.MCE=0b on any
+	 * core will shutdown the machine.
+	 */
+	return !per_cpu(cpuhp_state, cpu).booted_once;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool cpu_smt_allowed(unsigned int cpu) { return true; }
+#endif
+
 /* Need to know about CPUs going up/down? */
 int register_cpu_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 {
@@ -431,6 +511,16 @@ static int bringup_wait_for_ap(unsigned int cpu)
 	stop_machine_unpark(cpu);
 	kthread_unpark(st->thread);
 
+	/*
+	 * SMT soft disabling on X86 requires to bring the CPU out of the
+	 * BIOS 'wait for SIPI' state in order to set the CR4.MCE bit.  The
+	 * CPU marked itself as booted_once in cpu_notify_starting() so the
+	 * cpu_smt_allowed() check will now return false if this is not the
+	 * primary sibling.
+	 */
+	if (!cpu_smt_allowed(cpu))
+		return -ECANCELED;
+
 	/* Should we go further up ? */
 	if (st->target > CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE) {
 		__cpuhp_kick_ap_work(st);
@@ -817,7 +907,6 @@ static int takedown_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 
 	/* Park the smpboot threads */
 	kthread_park(per_cpu_ptr(&cpuhp_state, cpu)->thread);
-	smpboot_park_threads(cpu);
 
 	/*
 	 * Prevent irq alloc/free while the dying cpu reorganizes the
@@ -956,20 +1045,19 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int cpu_down_maps_locked(unsigned int cpu, enum cpuhp_state target)
+{
+	if (cpu_hotplug_disabled)
+		return -EBUSY;
+	return _cpu_down(cpu, 0, target);
+}
+
 static int do_cpu_down(unsigned int cpu, enum cpuhp_state target)
 {
 	int err;
 
 	cpu_maps_update_begin();
-
-	if (cpu_hotplug_disabled) {
-		err = -EBUSY;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	err = _cpu_down(cpu, 0, target);
-
-out:
+	err = cpu_down_maps_locked(cpu, target);
 	cpu_maps_update_done();
 	return err;
 }
@@ -993,6 +1081,7 @@ void notify_cpu_starting(unsigned int cpu)
 	enum cpuhp_state target = min((int)st->target, CPUHP_AP_ONLINE);
 
 	rcu_cpu_starting(cpu);	/* Enables RCU usage on this CPU. */
+	st->booted_once = true;
 	while (st->state < target) {
 		st->state++;
 		cpuhp_invoke_callback(cpu, st->state, true, NULL);
@@ -1098,6 +1187,10 @@ static int do_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, enum cpuhp_state target)
 		err = -EBUSY;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (!cpu_smt_allowed(cpu)) {
+		err = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	err = _cpu_up(cpu, 0, target);
 out:
@@ -1389,7 +1482,7 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_ap_states[] = {
 	[CPUHP_AP_SMPBOOT_THREADS] = {
 		.name			= "smpboot/threads:online",
 		.startup.single		= smpboot_unpark_threads,
-		.teardown.single	= NULL,
+		.teardown.single	= smpboot_park_threads,
 	},
 	[CPUHP_AP_PERF_ONLINE] = {
 		.name			= "perf:online",
@@ -1844,10 +1937,172 @@ static struct attribute_group cpuhp_cpu_root_attr_group = {
 	NULL
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
+
+static const char *smt_states[] = {
+	[CPU_SMT_ENABLED]		= "on",
+	[CPU_SMT_DISABLED]		= "off",
+	[CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED]	= "forceoff",
+	[CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED]		= "notsupported",
+};
+
+static ssize_t
+show_smt_control(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 2, "%s\n", smt_states[cpu_smt_control]);
+}
+
+static void cpuhp_offline_cpu_device(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	struct device *dev = get_cpu_device(cpu);
+
+	dev->offline = true;
+	/* Tell user space about the state change */
+	kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_OFFLINE);
+}
+
+static void cpuhp_online_cpu_device(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	struct device *dev = get_cpu_device(cpu);
+
+	dev->offline = false;
+	/* Tell user space about the state change */
+	kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ONLINE);
+}
+
+static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval)
+{
+	int cpu, ret = 0;
+
+	cpu_maps_update_begin();
+	for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+		if (topology_is_primary_thread(cpu))
+			continue;
+		ret = cpu_down_maps_locked(cpu, CPUHP_OFFLINE);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * As this needs to hold the cpu maps lock it's impossible
+		 * to call device_offline() because that ends up calling
+		 * cpu_down() which takes cpu maps lock. cpu maps lock
+		 * needs to be held as this might race against in kernel
+		 * abusers of the hotplug machinery (thermal management).
+		 *
+		 * So nothing would update device:offline state. That would
+		 * leave the sysfs entry stale and prevent onlining after
+		 * smt control has been changed to 'off' again. This is
+		 * called under the sysfs hotplug lock, so it is properly
+		 * serialized against the regular offline usage.
+		 */
+		cpuhp_offline_cpu_device(cpu);
+	}
+	if (!ret)
+		cpu_smt_control = ctrlval;
+	cpu_maps_update_done();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int cpuhp_smt_enable(void)
+{
+	int cpu, ret = 0;
+
+	cpu_maps_update_begin();
+	cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+	for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
+		/* Skip online CPUs and CPUs on offline nodes */
+		if (cpu_online(cpu) || !node_online(cpu_to_node(cpu)))
+			continue;
+		ret = _cpu_up(cpu, 0, CPUHP_ONLINE);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+		/* See comment in cpuhp_smt_disable() */
+		cpuhp_online_cpu_device(cpu);
+	}
+	cpu_maps_update_done();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+store_smt_control(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+		  const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	int ctrlval, ret;
+
+	if (sysfs_streq(buf, "on"))
+		ctrlval = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+	else if (sysfs_streq(buf, "off"))
+		ctrlval = CPU_SMT_DISABLED;
+	else if (sysfs_streq(buf, "forceoff"))
+		ctrlval = CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	ret = lock_device_hotplug_sysfs();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (ctrlval != cpu_smt_control) {
+		switch (ctrlval) {
+		case CPU_SMT_ENABLED:
+			ret = cpuhp_smt_enable();
+			break;
+		case CPU_SMT_DISABLED:
+		case CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED:
+			ret = cpuhp_smt_disable(ctrlval);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	unlock_device_hotplug();
+	return ret ? ret : count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(control, 0644, show_smt_control, store_smt_control);
+
+static ssize_t
+show_smt_active(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	bool active = topology_max_smt_threads() > 1;
+
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 2, "%d\n", active);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(active, 0444, show_smt_active, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *cpuhp_smt_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_control.attr,
+	&dev_attr_active.attr,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group cpuhp_smt_attr_group = {
+	.attrs = cpuhp_smt_attrs,
+	.name = "smt",
+	NULL
+};
+
+static int __init cpu_smt_state_init(void)
+{
+	return sysfs_create_group(&cpu_subsys.dev_root->kobj,
+				  &cpuhp_smt_attr_group);
+}
+
+#else
+static inline int cpu_smt_state_init(void) { return 0; }
+#endif
+
 static int __init cpuhp_sysfs_init(void)
 {
 	int cpu, ret;
 
+	ret = cpu_smt_state_init();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	ret = sysfs_create_group(&cpu_subsys.dev_root->kobj,
 				 &cpuhp_cpu_root_attr_group);
 	if (ret)
@@ -1944,7 +2199,10 @@ void __init boot_cpu_init(void)
 /*
  * Must be called _AFTER_ setting up the per_cpu areas
  */
-void __init boot_cpu_state_init(void)
+void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 {
-	per_cpu_ptr(&cpuhp_state, smp_processor_id())->state = CPUHP_ONLINE;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.booted_once, true);
+#endif
+	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
diff --git a/kernel/smp.c b/kernel/smp.c
index bba3b201668d..399905fdfa3f 100644
--- a/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/kernel/smp.c
@@ -564,6 +564,8 @@ void __init smp_init(void)
 			cpu_up(cpu);
 	}
 
+	/* Final decision about SMT support */
+	cpu_smt_check_topology();
 	/* Any cleanup work */
 	smp_announce();
 	smp_cpus_done(setup_max_cpus);
diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c
index 744fa611cae0..d257e624be25 100644
--- a/kernel/softirq.c
+++ b/kernel/softirq.c
@@ -79,12 +79,16 @@ static void wakeup_softirqd(void)
 
 /*
  * If ksoftirqd is scheduled, we do not want to process pending softirqs
- * right now. Let ksoftirqd handle this at its own rate, to get fairness.
+ * right now. Let ksoftirqd handle this at its own rate, to get fairness,
+ * unless we're doing some of the synchronous softirqs.
  */
-static bool ksoftirqd_running(void)
+#define SOFTIRQ_NOW_MASK ((1 << HI_SOFTIRQ) | (1 << TASKLET_SOFTIRQ))
+static bool ksoftirqd_running(unsigned long pending)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk = __this_cpu_read(ksoftirqd);
 
+	if (pending & SOFTIRQ_NOW_MASK)
+		return false;
 	return tsk && (tsk->state == TASK_RUNNING);
 }
 
@@ -324,7 +328,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void do_softirq(void)
 
 	pending = local_softirq_pending();
 
-	if (pending && !ksoftirqd_running())
+	if (pending && !ksoftirqd_running(pending))
 		do_softirq_own_stack();
 
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
@@ -351,7 +355,7 @@ void irq_enter(void)
 
 static inline void invoke_softirq(void)
 {
-	if (ksoftirqd_running())
+	if (ksoftirqd_running(local_softirq_pending()))
 		return;
 
 	if (!force_irqthreads) {
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index d2db2c4eb0a4..88f8d6a2af05 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -1641,6 +1641,9 @@ int vm_insert_pfn_prot(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 	if (track_pfn_insert(vma, &pgprot, __pfn_to_pfn_t(pfn, PFN_DEV)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!pfn_modify_allowed(pfn, pgprot))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	ret = insert_pfn(vma, addr, __pfn_to_pfn_t(pfn, PFN_DEV), pgprot);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -1659,6 +1662,9 @@ int vm_insert_mixed(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 	if (track_pfn_insert(vma, &pgprot, pfn))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!pfn_modify_allowed(pfn_t_to_pfn(pfn), pgprot))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	/*
 	 * If we don't have pte special, then we have to use the pfn_valid()
 	 * based VM_MIXEDMAP scheme (see vm_normal_page), and thus we *must*
@@ -1692,6 +1698,7 @@ static int remap_pte_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd,
 {
 	pte_t *pte;
 	spinlock_t *ptl;
+	int err = 0;
 
 	pte = pte_alloc_map_lock(mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
 	if (!pte)
@@ -1699,12 +1706,16 @@ static int remap_pte_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd,
 	arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode();
 	do {
 		BUG_ON(!pte_none(*pte));
+		if (!pfn_modify_allowed(pfn, prot)) {
+			err = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
 		set_pte_at(mm, addr, pte, pte_mkspecial(pfn_pte(pfn, prot)));
 		pfn++;
 	} while (pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
 	arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode();
 	pte_unmap_unlock(pte - 1, ptl);
-	return 0;
+	return err;
 }
 
 static inline int remap_pmd_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud,
@@ -1713,6 +1724,7 @@ static inline int remap_pmd_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud,
 {
 	pmd_t *pmd;
 	unsigned long next;
+	int err;
 
 	pfn -= addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	pmd = pmd_alloc(mm, pud, addr);
@@ -1721,9 +1733,10 @@ static inline int remap_pmd_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud,
 	VM_BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
 	do {
 		next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
-		if (remap_pte_range(mm, pmd, addr, next,
-				pfn + (addr >> PAGE_SHIFT), prot))
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		err = remap_pte_range(mm, pmd, addr, next,
+				pfn + (addr >> PAGE_SHIFT), prot);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1734,6 +1747,7 @@ static inline int remap_pud_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd,
 {
 	pud_t *pud;
 	unsigned long next;
+	int err;
 
 	pfn -= addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	pud = pud_alloc(mm, pgd, addr);
@@ -1741,9 +1755,10 @@ static inline int remap_pud_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	do {
 		next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
-		if (remap_pmd_range(mm, pud, addr, next,
-				pfn + (addr >> PAGE_SHIFT), prot))
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		err = remap_pmd_range(mm, pud, addr, next,
+				pfn + (addr >> PAGE_SHIFT), prot);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	} while (pud++, addr = next, addr != end);
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index ae740c9b1f9b..6896f77be166 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -260,6 +260,42 @@ unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
 	return pages;
 }
 
+static int prot_none_pte_entry(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr,
+			       unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk)
+{
+	return pfn_modify_allowed(pte_pfn(*pte), *(pgprot_t *)(walk->private)) ?
+		0 : -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int prot_none_hugetlb_entry(pte_t *pte, unsigned long hmask,
+				   unsigned long addr, unsigned long next,
+				   struct mm_walk *walk)
+{
+	return pfn_modify_allowed(pte_pfn(*pte), *(pgprot_t *)(walk->private)) ?
+		0 : -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int prot_none_test(unsigned long addr, unsigned long next,
+			  struct mm_walk *walk)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int prot_none_walk(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
+			   unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
+{
+	pgprot_t new_pgprot = vm_get_page_prot(newflags);
+	struct mm_walk prot_none_walk = {
+		.pte_entry = prot_none_pte_entry,
+		.hugetlb_entry = prot_none_hugetlb_entry,
+		.test_walk = prot_none_test,
+		.mm = current->mm,
+		.private = &new_pgprot,
+	};
+
+	return walk_page_range(start, end, &prot_none_walk);
+}
+
 int
 mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
 	unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
@@ -277,6 +313,19 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Do PROT_NONE PFN permission checks here when we can still
+	 * bail out without undoing a lot of state. This is a rather
+	 * uncommon case, so doesn't need to be very optimized.
+	 */
+	if (arch_has_pfn_modify_check() &&
+	    (vma->vm_flags & (VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP)) &&
+	    (newflags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC)) == 0) {
+		error = prot_none_walk(vma, start, end, newflags);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * If we make a private mapping writable we increase our commit;
 	 * but (without finer accounting) cannot reduce our commit if we
diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c
index 79c03ecd31c8..855f62ab8c1b 100644
--- a/mm/swapfile.c
+++ b/mm/swapfile.c
@@ -2219,6 +2219,35 @@ static int claim_swapfile(struct swap_info_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+
+/*
+ * Find out how many pages are allowed for a single swap device. There
+ * are two limiting factors:
+ * 1) the number of bits for the swap offset in the swp_entry_t type, and
+ * 2) the number of bits in the swap pte, as defined by the different
+ * architectures.
+ *
+ * In order to find the largest possible bit mask, a swap entry with
+ * swap type 0 and swap offset ~0UL is created, encoded to a swap pte,
+ * decoded to a swp_entry_t again, and finally the swap offset is
+ * extracted.
+ *
+ * This will mask all the bits from the initial ~0UL mask that can't
+ * be encoded in either the swp_entry_t or the architecture definition
+ * of a swap pte.
+ */
+unsigned long generic_max_swapfile_size(void)
+{
+	return swp_offset(pte_to_swp_entry(
+			swp_entry_to_pte(swp_entry(0, ~0UL)))) + 1;
+}
+
+/* Can be overridden by an architecture for additional checks. */
+__weak unsigned long max_swapfile_size(void)
+{
+	return generic_max_swapfile_size();
+}
+
 static unsigned long read_swap_header(struct swap_info_struct *p,
 					union swap_header *swap_header,
 					struct inode *inode)
@@ -2254,22 +2283,7 @@ static unsigned long read_swap_header(struct swap_info_struct *p,
 	p->cluster_next = 1;
 	p->cluster_nr = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * Find out how many pages are allowed for a single swap
-	 * device. There are two limiting factors: 1) the number
-	 * of bits for the swap offset in the swp_entry_t type, and
-	 * 2) the number of bits in the swap pte as defined by the
-	 * different architectures. In order to find the
-	 * largest possible bit mask, a swap entry with swap type 0
-	 * and swap offset ~0UL is created, encoded to a swap pte,
-	 * decoded to a swp_entry_t again, and finally the swap
-	 * offset is extracted. This will mask all the bits from
-	 * the initial ~0UL mask that can't be encoded in either
-	 * the swp_entry_t or the architecture definition of a
-	 * swap pte.
-	 */
-	maxpages = swp_offset(pte_to_swp_entry(
-			swp_entry_to_pte(swp_entry(0, ~0UL)))) + 1;
+	maxpages = max_swapfile_size();
 	last_page = swap_header->info.last_page;
 	if (!last_page) {
 		pr_warn("Empty swap-file\n");
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index aea30afeddb8..fbc1474960e3 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB	( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
 #define X86_FEATURE_STIBP	( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ZEN		( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
-
+#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV	( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW  ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D		(18*32+28) /* Flush L1D cache */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD	(18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
@@ -349,5 +350,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1	X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2	X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
 #define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
+#define X86_BUG_L1TF		X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */